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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER was heard as a court trial on March 5 and 6, 2013. Thomas E. Dvorak
appeared representing the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented by Joseph Borton and
Victor Villegas. Numerous exhibits were admitted by the court and Plaintiff Jay Brown,
Defendant Augusta Greenheart, and Plaintiff Christine Brown testified. The Defendant's
exhibits had previously been admitted as Plaintiff's exhibits, so this decision uses the Plaintiff's
designations. The parties presented oral closing arguments but the Court allowed the parties
until April 8, 2013, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court now
enters the following Decision on Court Trial that constitutes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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This action was initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the
"Browns") on April 5, 2012. The Browns assert two causes of action against Defendant Augusta
Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Dr. Greenheart") in the Complaint to Quiet Title. Each asks the
court to Quiet Title and enter a Declaratory Judgment relating to water rights owned by the
Browns which Dr. Greenheart claims were passed to her under the general appurtenancy clause
of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the land from the Browns. Count 1 requests a
declaratory judgment on contract interpretation. Count 2 requests a declaratory judgment under
the principles of promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver.
In its January 31, 2013 decision on cross motions for summary judgment, this Court
granted in part and denied in part, ruling "the matters presented by both sides in support of the
motions for summary judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a
question of fact that precludes summary judgment." Order at p. 10. The Plaintiffs' Motion to
file an Amended Complaint was denied at the pretrial conference on February 22, 2013.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired a parcel of approximately 320 acres

of land situated in the East Yi of Section 24, Township 4 South, Range 5 East in Elmore County,
Idaho ("Original Brown Property") by way of a Quitclaim Deed.
2. The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 with a priority date of February 17, 1966 and 61-7151 with a priority
date of April 9, 1973 (the "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October 26, 2000.
3. Water Right No. 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres of
land within a permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original
Brown Property.
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4. Water Right No. 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of
land within a permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original
Brown Property.

5. As dee~ the Water Rights in 3. and 4. above could be used together to irrigate no
more than 287 acres within the combined total 320 acres in the Original Brown Property in a
single irrigation season.
6. Neither of the Water Rights have been used to irrigate any portion of the Greenheart
Property since at least 1986.
7. On August 28, 2003, the Browns leased portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to
160 acres of the Original Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water
Supply Bank. Pursuant to that lease, the Browns contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of
the 287 authorized acres from irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remained in effect on the
date of trial. The water rights could not be used while in the bank.
8. In the middle of2006, Mr. Brown contracted to sell 272 acres of the Water Rights

alone for $1,450.00 per acre to Idaho Water Company. This written and signed contract
continued from mid-2006 until 2009. The buyer did not perform on this contract and the
contract was terminated in 2009.
9. In December 2006, the Browns listed 60 acres of the Original Brown Property for sale
with an asking price of $80,000.00. The property was listed for sale through a real estate agent,
Daryl Rhead.
11.

The sixty acres listed were not previously irrigated by the Browns by either

handlines before 2007 (irrigated portion depicted in Plaintiff's Exhibit 46) or center pivot after
2007 (irrigated portion depicted in Plaintiff's Exhibit 44). The sixty acres listed for sale are

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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depicted within the yellow rectangle on Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 and did not have any apparatus to
apply irrigation water since 1988 or at the time of the listing for sale.
12. Mr. Brown told Mr. Rhead that the tenns of the listing were to be dry ground with no
water rights since it was not Mr. Brown's intent to transfer the water rights with the real estate at
the time of the sale.
13.

The broker's listing shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit S did not have any information

under "Irrigation?," "Irrigation Dist?," "Irrig Dist Name," or "Irrigation type." Under the listing
of features, "Water'' was listed as "Proposed Well."
14.

Mr. Brown testified that his understanding of Plaintiff's Exhibit S was that no

irrigation system, watershares, or water rights were available for pmchase as part of this listing.
15.

Augusta Greenheart wanted to invest in real estate in the Mountain Home area.

16.

Ms. Green testified that she had come to the United States from Japan as a

teenager; had attended school in the United States including obtaining four college degrees
including a Master of Arts in Teaching and a Doctorate in Education. She considers English her
primary language and has taught English for many years although she still speaks with a
Japanese accent. In the courtroom, she clearly had a command of the English language and was
able to communicate effectively with the court and counsel.
17.

In 2006, Ms. Green spoke with Mr. Rhead about her interest in pmchasing vacant

acres in the Mountain Home area Mr. Rhead later called to tell her of sixty acres that were
available for pmchase for $80,000.00. Ms. Greenheart discussed with Mr. Rhead that she
wanted vacant land with low taxes and low maintenance.
18.

All communications between Plaintiffs and Ms. Greenheart at all times

throughout the negotiation and sale were through Mr. Rhead, the real estate agent. Mr. Rhead

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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was both the listing and the selling agent for this agreement Mr. Rhead did not testify at the
trial.
19.

Ms. Greenheart saw Plaintiff's Exhibit S, the broker's listing, before the sale.

She said she thought that "Proposed Well" meant that someone had proposed a well and that if
she purchased the land, she may get a well. She testified that it did not say irrigation was
restricted or that the land did not have one so she "was okay" with the possibility of getting one.
20.

Ms. Oreenheart stated she asked Mr. Rhead some questions about the property

and after he described it to her, she made an offer within about three days to purchase the
property without looking at or inspecting the property. She stated she asked Mr. Rhead "if there
was any water coming through" and she stated all she could remember of the response was "it is
dry.,, She thought she asked him if she could dig a well and he responded yes, but she said there

was no discussion of actually digging a well because at that time she knew that it was not cheap
to dig a well. She testified that Mr. Rhead did not tell her the property had a water right, "he said
it was dry.,, She also testified that in 2007, she did not think she had to have a decreed water
right to dig a well.
21.

Ms. Oreenheart testified that at the time of the negotiation and sale of the

property, she thought "dry" when used by Mr. Rhead meant "dry." She said that at that time, she
thought this meant there was no surface water across the property. She said that in her
conversations with Mr.

Rhe~

they did not differentiate between the terms surface water or

water right.
22.

Ms. Greenheart testified at trial that she owned several other properties including

a house in Japan, two properties in Alaska, two properties in Nevada, and another property in
Emmett, Idaho. She testified that she had first heard the term water right in conjunction with her

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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property in Emmett which she had purchased prior to negotiating on the Mountain Home
property. She testified with the property in Emmett she had received shares of water through an
irrigation district and considered a water right as water running through the land. She had not
made statements in her earlier affidavit filed in this case or in her deposition about the Emmett
property or how that influenced her understanding in this case. She later testified in this case that
she did not remember what she understood water rights to mean in 2007.
23.

Ms. Greenheart testified that she understood irrigation to mean water artificially

brought to the land and knew of center pivot irrigation systems before 2007.
24.

Ms. Greenheart was not told at any time before closing of the property that there

were Water Rights associated with the 320 acre property adjudicated and decreed by the Snake
River Basin Adjudication.
25.

Ms. Greenheart submitted an offer on January 4, 2007 by way of Plaintiff's

Exhibit 6, a "Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement." She offered to purchase

the property from the Browns for $76,000.00 under the terms in this agreement.
26.

Ms. Greenheart explained her understanding of the agreement at the time it was

made. She acknowledged under paragraph 23 that it was the entire agreement. She
acknowledged that paragraph 6 "strongly advised" her to inspect the property but she chose not
to have an inspection. She acknowledged paragraph 5 and said her definition of not applicable
or NA was that it was "not applicable."
27.

Paragraph 6.E. states under "Utilities, Improvements & Other Rights" that "Seller

represents that the property does have the following utilities, improvements, services and other
rights available (describe availability):" and that NIA was specifically entered into the
agreement.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT
6

542

••
28.

Paragraph 16 of the agreement states,

16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells, springs, water,
ditches, ditch rights, etc., if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on or used in
connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless otherwise provided
herein: [left blank].
29.

Mr. Brown testified that nothing was listed in paragraph 16 after the colon so he

believed it meant that there was nothing "as far as water rights go" since there was nothing listed
at this point in the agreement.
30.

Ms. Greenheart explained her understanding of this agreement was that it did not

mention that water was excluded. She said that unless she saw "limited to" or "excluded," then
she assumed it was included.
31.

In the purchase and sale agreement, there was also a box allocating which party

would pay the water rights transfer fee and the "X'' was placed in the box for not applicable.
32.

The purchase and sale agreement was accompanied by a Seller's Property

Disclosure Form, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, which Ms. Greenheart testified she probably saw prior to
purchase. Under the disclosure entitled, "Irrigation water provided by:," there also appeared
"NIA" for not applicable.
33.

Both Jay and Christine Brown testified that they reviewed the terms of the

Purchase and Sale Agreement before entering into the agreement.
34.

The Browns counteroffered for the full $80,000.00 purchase price by way of the

RE-13 Counteroffer, the last page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Ms. Greenheart accepted the
counteroffer. The purchase price represents $1,333.33 per acre ofland.
35.

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. A contract term is

ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is
nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). This
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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court finds as a matter of law that the language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is subject to
two different reasonable interpretations. Therefore, interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of
fact. Ba/c/cer v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005).
Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. Idaho courts look solely to the face of a written
agreement to determine whether it is [patently] ambiguous while a latent ambiguity is not evident
on the face of the instrument alone, but becomes apparent when applying the instrument to the
facts as they exist. Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585 (1996); Accord,

Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P .2d 415 ( 1991 ); In re Estate ofKirlc, 121 Idaho
817' 824, 907 p .2d 794, 801 ( 1995).
Regarding the Purchase and Sale Agreement, neither party is entitled to any presumption
against the drafter. The court has looked at the face of the document and given the words or
phrases used their established definitions in common use or settled legal meanings. The Court
listened to the testimony of each witness and observed each witness's demeanor while testifying.
I find as a fact that the language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is ambiguous. More
specifically, Paragraph 16 is ambiguous because of the placement of a colon at the end of the
sentence rather than a period. Mr. Brown contends "herein:" meant "herein within this
document" and subject to the interpretation of other paragraphs. Ms. Greenheart contends
"herein:" meant "herein within this paragraph." Both interpretations are reasonable even
applying the common meanings of these words and Paragraph 16 is ambiguous. Since the
language of the contract is ambiguous the court found extrinsic evidence of the contracting
parties' intent relevant. Related to the parties' intent, the court also found the subsequent
statements of Ms. Greenheart relevant for impeaching her statement that she did not understand
in 2007 that she did not have water rights.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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In reading the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the court reads Paragraph 16 in

conjunction with other parts of the document, including Paragraph 6.E. and the costs box, and
finds as a matter of fact that the Water Rights and any irrigation system were excluded by listing
an abbreviation for "not applicable" in Paragraph 6.E. Paragraph 6.E. states, "Seller represents
that the property does have the following utilities, improvements, services and other rights

available (describe availability): N/A." Although such information could have been repeated
again after the colon in Paragraph 16, it was not, which Ms. Greenheart testified caused
confusion. Paragraph 16 did not specifically exclude an irrigation system or Water Rights
although they were excluded by exception earlier in the agreement. Therefore, the court looked
to the previous information and course of conduct of the parties in determining the parties' intent
in this agreement. The broker's listing agreement which Ms. Greenheart testified she had seen
prior to the offer indicates there were no water rights or irrigation system with the property (other
than a proposed well, discussed below). Ms. Greenheart testified she was told by Mr. Rhead that

the property was "dry" and understood that to mean "dry." As to other explanations offered at
trial by Ms. Greenheart, the court finds her credibility was impeached by her subsequent
statements to Elmore County offices about her understanding that she had no water rights. I find
as a fact that at the time of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Browns intended to sell 80
acres of land without its proportionate appurtenant Water Rights and Ms. Greenheart intended to
purchase 80 acres of"dry" land without appurtenant Water Rights other than either an existing
well on the property or the ability to drill a well.
14.

In January of 2007, Ms. Greenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) acres of

the Original Brown Property from the Browns, leaving the Browns with approximately 260 acres
(the "Current Brown Property'').

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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15.

A Warranty Deed, Plaintifrs Exhibit 8, was signed on January 29, 2007 by the

Plaintiffs stating
Jay B. Brown and Christine M.

Hopson-Bro~

husband and wife

GRANTOR(S) do(es) hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and CONVEY unto
Augusta Sayoko D. Mimoto Greenheart, a single woman, GRANTEE(S)

The following described real property in Elmore County, Idaho to wit [legal
description] SAVE AND EXCEPT that portion [deeded as a right-of-way].
Subject to: taxes, easements and restrictions of record.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances except as
described above and that Grantor will warrant and defend the same from all
lawful claims whatsoever.
The Warranty Deed was recorded in Elmore County on January 30, 2007 as Instrument#
384017.
16.

The Warranty Deed was prepared by First American Title. The closing escrow fee

included the preparation and recording of the deed was shared equally by the Plaintiffs and the
Defendant under Paragraph 21 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and testimony at trial.
Plaintiffs Exhibits 9 and 10 reflect that the settlement or closing fee was split equally between
both parties. Neither party is entitled to a presumption against the drafter of the deed.
17.

The Browns reviewed the Warranty Deed before signing it.

18.

In determining the credibility of Ms. Greenheart's testimony at trial, the court

considered her subsequent statements for impeachment purposes under Idaho Rule of Evidence
607. Additionally, the court considered these later statements substantively as proof for Count 2.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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19.

Ms. Greenheart submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the Elmore County

Board of Equalization ("Board") for the Greenheart Property wherein Dr. Greenheart challenged
the classification of the Greenheart Property as irrigated agriculture. She sought to have it
reclassified as dry grazing. In both a July 2, 2007 letter admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 and a
July 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, Ms. Greenheart wrote and
signed statements to the assessor's office saying she purchased 60 acres from Mr. Jay Brown.
Both letters say, "At the time of purchase, I was told that the land is dry and [the] grass that
grows is good for cattle and there is no structure of any kind; therefore, the tax will be minimal.
I was very surprised when I received the year 2007 tax assessment."
20.

Neither Jay Brown nor Augusta Greenheart testified at trial that they believed the

reclassification of the property to irrigated agriculture was correct.
21.

Ms. Greenheart asked Jay Brown to assist her with the appeal and submitted a

written authorization to the Board for Mr. Brown to represent her before the Board. On July 6,
2007, Jay Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Greenheart Property was
dry land. Ms. Greenheart acknowledged at trial that she had asked for and appreciated Mr.

Brown's help before the Board. Mr. Brown submitted a letter he drafted at Ms. Greenheart's
request to the Elmore County Board of Tax Equalization. The letter was also copied to Ms.
Greenheart. Specifically, in Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 he indicated: "The property referenced, has
no water right with the Idaho Water Resources. It was strictly for dry grazing. Ms. Greenheart's
tax levy indicates that the property is irrigated; however, the property is not and will not be

irrigated unless at such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms. Greenheart."
22.

Mr. Brown testified that at the time of this statement, he did not believe that any

water right had been transferred with the Greenheart property.

FINDINGS 014' FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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23.

At this time, Mr. Brown also signed a dry grazing lease at Ms. Greenheart's

request to help her reduce her taxes on the property by, having the property reclassified as dry
grazing. Ms. Greenheart actually drafted this dry grazing lease by downloading a Word version
of an apartment lease off the Internet and then modifying it herself into a dry grazing lease. In
drafting the lease, she specifically provided that lessee shall not use the leased premised for any
other purpose other than dry grazing. The lease was backdated.
24.

As a result of these documents and efforts by both Mr. Brown and Ms.

Greenheart, the Board granted Ms. Greenheart's request on July 6, 2007 and "an adjustment
[was] made back to dry grazing... " on the Greenheart Property according to Plaintiff's Exhibit
22. The 2008 Assessment Notice reflected the change to Category 5 Dry Grazing and resulted in
an annual reduction of$600.00 in real estate taxes on the Greenheart property.
25.

Later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the split of

the Greenheart Property. Elmore County made an offer to Ms. Greenheart to purchase the
Greenheart Property. In a November 8, 2009 e-mail to an Elmore County employee concerning
Elmore County's offer to purchase the Greenheart Property, Ms. Greenheart stated "At the time
of my purchase, I was very aware that my parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to
build a residence. Again, at the time of the purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry
grazing only due to lack of an irrigation system and no water rights." Plaintiff's Exhibit 28. She
declined to sell the property at that time at the offered price although the e-mail reflected she
would consider selling in the future at a higher price. The offered amount was not in evidence.
26.

In February 2012, the Browns were contemplating one or more sales or transfers

of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. The Browns had an offer from the City of Mountain
Home to purchase their water rights for $2,000 per acre. The Browns spoke with attorney

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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Michael Creamer regarding the potential sale and learned that the reference to "appurtenances"
in a deed may have included the water rights.
27.

On February 8, 2012, Jay Brown contacted Ms. Greenheart by telephone to

discuss the Water Rights. Ms. Greenheart testified that during the conversation, Mr. Brown
indicated he had ~'mistakenly sold the groundwater right to her."
28.

After the telephone call, on February 17, 2012 Ms. Greenheart filed with IDWR a

Notice of Change of Water Right Ownership where Ms. Greenheart stated the Water Rights were
44

divided proportionally based on the portion of their place(s) of use acquired by the new owner"

and attached a copy of the Warranty Deed, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 29.
29.

On March 9, 2012 and by subsequent revision on March 22, 2012, the IDWR

revised its water right database to indicate Ms. Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the
Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water
Rights decreed to the Browns commensurately.
30.

On July 17, 2012, the Browns entered into an amended agreement to sell their

remaining portions of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 to the City of Mountain Home for
$466,400.00 under the terms in Plaintiff's Exhibit 36.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issue at trial was whether there was a mutual mistake in the warranty deed. The
party asserting mutual mistake bears the burden of proof. 1\Jurr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773,
777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is significant-mutual mistake must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Cline v. Hoyle & Associates, Ins., Inc., 108 Idaho 162,
164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Mutual mistake is a question of fact and a trial court's finding
will only be overturned if clearly erroneous. Id.
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A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Bailey
v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671P.2d1099, 1102 (Ct App. 1983). The mistake must be
material or, in other words, so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.

Id; O'Connor v. Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. As stated, the mistake in question
must be shared among the parties. In Idaho, as long as there is a different belief as to the same
assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. Before relief will be granted, it must appear that the
mistake is mutual. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190, 191 P. 1029, 1030 (1920).
A. An Unintentional Act or Omission Occurred

As to the first of the elements, proof of a mistake-an unintentional act or omission
arising from ignorance, surprise or misplaced confidence-is required. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d
at 1102. Here, the mistake was a belief that no water rights were being transferred as part of the
sale of the property when, in fact, the Warranty Deed used language that effected just such a
transfer. Mr. Brown's testified he conveyed to Mr. Rhead that he did not intend to sell the water
rights and that the sale was to be as dry ground. The Browns had a pending contract for the sale
of the Water Rights from mid-2006 (before the listing of the property for sale) all the way until
2009. The Water Rights were never used on the Greenheart Property.
Ms. Greenheart testified that she contacted Mr. Rhead looking for property in the
Mountain Home area that was vacant land. She testified that she inquired about water on the
property and was told the property was "dry" and that she thought that meant "dry." She testified

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
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that she does not remember what she understood water rights to mean in 2007, although she
testified to a different result in obtaining some access to water on her Emmett, Idaho, property.
The Seller's Property Disclosure Form indicated not applicable next to the entry for irrigation
water available and the broker's listing had a "blank" next to irrigation. There was much
discussion at trial of the parties' understanding of Paragraph 16 of the Vacant Land Purchase and
Sale Agreement. Mr. Brown thought that paragraph meant water rights were excluded since not
listed; while Ms. Greenheart testified she thought they were included since not specifically
excluded. When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. Cristo
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). "In the absence

of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according
to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G, 1nc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). A contract term is ambiguous when there are two different
reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145
Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law,
but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of fact. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham,
L.L.C., 141Idaho185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005)(quotation omitted).

As noted above in the findings of fact, the documents and the conversations which
occurred before the signing of the Warranty Deed indicate that it was not the intent of the
Browns to convey the Water Rights and Ms. Greenheart intended to purchase "dry" land.
Although Ms. Greenheart testified that the land may have had a well or that one had been
proposed, she never testified that she believed it actually had a well. Additionally, she testified
she had foregone an inspection of the property before the sale and that she did not actually think
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there was a well. Her testimony was that she was "okay" with having a well but knew she had
the risk of an additional expense to dig a well if one was not on the property.
Although Ms. Greenheart was not told about the decreed Water Rights until 2012, in
reviewing all of the evidence at trial, the court does not find that there was an intentional
misrepresentation or secreting of the existing Water Rights. While Jay Brown, Christine Brown,
and Augusta Greenheart are all articulate, intelligent people, none have formal training in civil
law or specifically in water rights in Idaho. The explanation that the Browns had the Water
Rights under contract for sale and thought they were conveyed separately, although mistaken, is
reasonable and without fraud or malice. Additionally, the fact that a significant portion of the
Water Rights were leased to the water bank served to avoid abandonment of the beneficial use of
the rights. The court has already noted its observations of Ms. Greenheart's demeanor and
testimony at trial and its determination the credibility of her explanations of her recollection from
six years ago. Both of the parties relied upon Mr. Rhead and the title company for their
expertise. Since both Mr. Rhead and the title company's services were procured and paid for by
both parties, neither party is entitled to a presumption against the drafter of the sale documents or
the Warranty Deed.
Based upon the evidence at trial, Ms. Greenheart at the time of contracting understood
that access to water on the property was only by a proposed well on the property. At the time of
the sale, Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111 provided that no water right was necessary to operate
a well for domestic purposes. Although Ms. Greenheart did not have the specific information
available as to how a well could exist on the property, as a matter of law, there was and is a legal
means to obtain a well. Her understanding at the time of sale that a well would not be "cheap" is

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT
16

152

also correct. The omission of references to specific references of the Water Rights was
unintentional given that they were already under contract for sale.
B. The Mistake was Common to Both Parties

The court previously discussed its assessment of whether there was an omission of the
Water Rights in the sale transaction and Ms. Greenheart's credibility at trial along with her
subsequent admissions as to her belief of whether there were water rights at the time of sale. The
court adopts those findings of fact and conclusions of law in this part of the decision and
detennines these were a mistake common to both parties. Even though Ms. Greenheart was not
aware of the adjudicated Water Rights until 2012, she still had a mistaken belief that there were
no water rights intended to be conveyed or actually conveyed in the 2007 sale.
The parties do not have to make the exact same mistake, so long as they share the same
basic misassumption of fact. A '4tnutual mistake also has been defined to include situations in
which the parties labor under differing misconceptions as to the same basic assumption or vital
fact." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). According to
the Restatement ofContracts, Section 152 cmt. H, "[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only
where both parties are mistaken as to the same basic assumption. Their mistakes need not be, and
often they will not be, identical." Based upon the evidence at trial of the understanding oftha
parties at the time of the contract for sale, both parties in this case shared the same basic
misassumption that no water rights were being transferred. While the Browns knew precisely
what water rights were, they were mistaken that having the sale of the Water Rights under a
pending contract removed them from the sale of the land. Ms. Greenheart had a less precise
understanding of what water rights were but she still did not believe in 2007 that she had
pW'Chased any water rights other than perhaps access to either a well or to dig a well. While she
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testified at trial that she was unclear at the time of contracting as to the distinction between water
rights and swface water rights, the court considered her statements after the sale for purposes of
impeachment. It is clear from Ms. Greenheart's own statements after the sale that she knew and
understood the property had been sold as "dry" without water rights. Thus, there was a
commonality of mistake as to the same basic assumption, that no ''water rights" were being
transferred.
C. The Mistake was Material

The third element of mutual mistake, materiality, means essentially that the mistake is so
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 0 'Connor v.

Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)(quoting Primary
Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep't ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002)).

Mr. Brown testified to the value of the water rights and how he would not have gone forward
with the sale had he known the Water Rights were being included. Mr. Brown initiated the
adjudication for the Water Rights at issue in this case. He testified that the priority dates of the
Water Rights granted were relatively senior water rights out in that area and valuable.
A significant portion of the Water Rights had been leased to the water bank since 2003
which prohibited the use of the water on the property but served to avoid abandonment of the
rights. The Browns had also entered into a contract in mid-2006 with Idaho Water Company or
Del Coates at a price of $1,450 per acre. It is also significant that it was Ms. Greenheart who
contacted the realtor about the potential sale of vacant land and that it was not the Browns who
initially contacted the realtor to initiate the sale of the land.

Mr. Brown testified that at the time of listing the property he told the realtor, Mr. Rhead,
that in coming up with a price, it was "for the dry ground, and there would be no water rights to
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go with it." Mr. Brown testified that in coming up with that price, he had a friend who sold
property to the north of this property by two miles for $1,500 an acre without water rights
whereas another friend sold development property for around $3,000 an acre with water rights.

Mr. Brown testified it was not his intent to transfer water rights to Ms. Greenheart at the time of
the sale of the Greenheart Property. Both of the Browns testified they would not have signed the
Warranty Deed had they known that it was in fact transferring the Water Rights at issue.
Therefore, the mistake was material.
D. Mistake Shown by Clear and Convincing Evidence
The Plaintiff bore the burden of proof at trial to show there was a mutual mistake proven
by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the testimony of all witnesses at trial and the
exhibits admitted into evidence, the Plaintiff has met this significant burden. The Plaintiffs have
shown that both parties, at the time of contracting, shared a misconception about a vital fact upon
which they based their bargain. This mistake that no Water Rights were intended to be
transferred with the land was material and so substantial and :fundamental as to defeat the object
of the parties. The Browns had intended to sell the Water Rights separately even before the land
was listed for sale. Ms. Greenheart had intended to have vacant land with low taxes and low
maintenance that she understood was "dry'" to assist in accomplishing her goals. Each party's
mistake was unintentional and arose from all three: ignorance, surprise and misplaced
confidence. So, although there were different reasons for the mistake, the mistake was still
shared among the parties. The Plaintiff met its burden of proof at trial by showing clear and
convincing evidence of a mutual mistake.
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E. The Affirmative Defense of the Statute of Limitations for Mutual Mistake

The Defendant raised the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations has run for a
claim of mistake. In analyzing other statute of limitations defenses, this Court previously held:
Applying the plain language of Idaho Code Section 6-401, the applicable statute
of limitations did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim
against the water rights by filing with I.D.W.R. There is no evidence in the
record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged
water rights for the land she pW'Chased from January 29, 2007, until February 17,
2012. So, filing with the l.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any
ownership in the water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title
action filed on April 5, 2012, is well within all the statute of limitations asserted
by the parties.
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7.
Now, the Defendant argues Idaho Code§ 5-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute
of limitations for a claim based on mistake has passed. The Defendant bears the burden of
proving this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Idaho Code Section 5-218(4) provides a plaintiff has three years to file suit for:
[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in
such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved
party, of the faets constituting the fraud or mistake.
Idaho Code§ 5-218(4). The statute oflimitations begins to run at the discovery of"facts
constituting the ... mistake." The Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs should have discovered the
mistake at three points, each of which would have been more than three years prior to the filing
of the Complaint in the instant action: (1) at the time of the execution of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement; (2) at the time of the execution of the warranty deed; and (3) when Jay Brown was
contacted by Ms. Greenheart in June 2007 to tell him the property was assessed as irrigated.
Nothing in the PW'Chase and Sale Agreement would have given notice to the Browns or
Ms. Greenheart of facts constituting the mistake. In fact, any part of that agreement that would
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have provided notice would have also avoided this entire litigation. The same is true of the
execution of the Warranty Deed. While payment for legal advice in reviewing the deed would
have been money well

spen~

both parties paid for and acquired the services of a realtor and a

title company in the preparation of the deed. The question for the court is whether the Browns
could have discovered the mistake in 2007 by the exercise of due diligence. Aitken v. Gill, 108
Idaho 900, 902, 702 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985). It is clear from the evidence that the
Browns read the Warranty Deed before they signed the deed but did not attach the weighty legal
significance to three words ''with their appurtenances" that these words actually carry. They
obtained the assistance of a licensed realtor to assist with the sale and the assistance of a
professional title company to assist in the document preparation. The Defendant would like for
this court to rule that not understanding these three words was ''negligence" or that not obtaining
legal counsel to provide advice on its legal significance was ''negligence." Although many states
require licensed legal advice before a real estate closing, this court will not hold that to be the
law in Idaho or find that the absence of legal advice at closing is negligence per se. This is not
an issue of negligence but rather whether the Browns could have discovered the mistake in the

exercise ofdue diligence.
To assist the trial court on remand, the Aitken court noted that the recordation of the
deeds only provided notice to subsequent purchasers and no had bearing on the due diligence of
the sellers. Due diligence is a question of the seller's actual knowledge when they signed and
delivered the deeds. Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361.
"Unless ... it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve
[water rights], appurtenant water rights pass with the land even though they are not mentioned in
the deed and the deed does not mention 'appurtenances."' Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,
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803, 241P.3d972, 976 (2010). Although the Defendant bears the burden of proof on this
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the actual knowledge of the Browns and
the parties' intent to reserve the water rights appurtenant to the land at issue have already been
discussed and analyzed in the court's previous discussion of mistake. So, although the
Defendant bears the burden by a lower standard on this affirmative defense, the court has already
concluded the Plaintiff has shown by clear and convincing evidence there was a material mutual
mistake and that, absent such mistake, the Browns would not have sold the property to Ms.
Greenheart using the Warranty Deed conveyed. The conclusions of fact and law will not be
reiterated here but this court finds these facts support that the Browns had no actual knowledge
upon execution of the Warranty Deed that the water rights were conveyed and that they had
procured the professional assistance necessary to prepare the documents and adequately
reviewed the documents to fulfill their requirements for due diligence at that time. Therefore,
this court does not find that the execution of the warranty dead was a mistake that could have
been discovered at that time with the exercise of due diligence that would have started the
running of the three years statute of limitations for mistake. ·
Next, in reviewing all of the evidence surrounding Mr. Brown's June 9, 2007 letter to the
Board of Equalization, this Court finds that neither party was sufficiently on notice simply
because the County began assessing the property as irrigated. Ms. Greenheart indicated
"surprise" at the assessment. Mr. Brown stated he previously owned the property nineteen years
and it was never once irrigated. And most telling, the Board of Equalization's minutes confirm
the adjustment "has been made back to dry grazing ... .'' The Court, after hearing all of the
evidence in this case, finds that the Idaho Code§ 5-218(4) statute of limitations began to run at
the discovery of "facts constituting the ... mistake." In the evidence before the court, the
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discovery of the facts constituting the mistake would have been during Mr. Brown's
conversation with Mr. Creamer about the legal effect of the "with their appurtenances" language
of the deed in 2012. Therefore, this action was filed well within the statute of limitations and the
Defendant has not shown the affirmative defense of the running of the statute of limitations by a
preponderance of the evidence.
F. Count 2 for Promissory Estoppel

The Plaintiff has not met their burden of proof of promissory estoppel by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff was required to show each element of l) reliance
upon a specific promise; 2) substantial economic loss to the promisee as a result of such reliance,
3) the loss to the promisee was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor, and 4) the
promisee's reliance on the promise must have been reasonable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club,
Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 182, 804 P.2d 900, 911 (1991). No
evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs that any forbearance on their part was caused by Ms.
Greenheart. The Browns had already placed the Water Rights under contract before they even
knew Ms. Greenheart was interested in purchasing land in the area, and that contract ended on its
own terms by nonperformance of the parties. The Plaintiffs have not proved their claim of
promissory estoppel.
G. Count 2 for Quasi Estoppel

Quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party,
which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist.
No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: l) The
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and 2) either the
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, the other party
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was induced to change positions, or it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or
in which he or she has acquiesced. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668
(2008). In Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 13 8 P.3d 310, 314 (2006), the court stated "to
prove quasi-estoppel ... there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to permit the
offending party to assert allegedly contrary positions."
The Court finds Ms. Greenheart is now taking a different position than her original
position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009. The Court
considered Ms. Greenheart's admissions that she asked Mr. Rhead and was told the property was
"dry;'' that she was "very surprised" to find the land assessed as irrigated six months after the

sale. The court also considered her repeated admissions to the .~sessor in 2007 and to Elmore
County in 2009 that she knew at the time of the sale that the property was "dry" and lacked an
irrigation system or a water right.
Ms. Greenheart has gained a tax advantage over the years by taking the original position
that the land was "dry" at the time she bought Additionally, Ms. Greenheart's actions in
confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a disadvantage to the Browns because the
Browns could have sold the Water Rights they had under contract, or at least discovered the
mistake and clarified ownership of the rights sooner. In review of all of the evidence before the
court, including the contracted water rights value as well as the contracts for sale of those rights,
the Court does find it would also be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having received
the tax benefit and met her goals of acquiring low-maintenance and low-tax vacant land, to
essentially take a windfall of additional water rights that were never intended by the parties at the
time of their contract.
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H. Count 2 for Waiver

In the court's decision on summary judgment, the court found the Plaintiff had not
presented evidence of waiver. Regarding waiver, The Idaho Supreme Court summarized the
doctrine of waiver as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego
some right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have
demanded and insisted upon.
A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and altered
the party's position.
Waiver is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and justice. The existence of
waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is foremost a question of intent. In
order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, although it
may be established by conduct.
Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). At

time of summary judgment, the Plaintiff did not present the evidence that the Plaintiff had again
entered into another contract for sale of the Water Rights. Because of this evidence, the court
has reconsidered its earlier decision as to waiver. Since the Brown's 2007 agreement to sell the
water rights predated any interaction with Ms. Greenheart and was terminated for other reasons,
there is no evidence that Plaintiffs altered their position in reliance upon any alleged waiver.
However, at trial, the Plaintiffs proved that they had subsequently entered into another contract
for sale of the Water Rights acting in reliance upon Ms. Greenheart's assertions to Elmore
County that she did not have any water rights on the property. Although this court has
previously found that the Plaintiff has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ms.
Greenheart understood that she did not have water rights at the time of the sale, even if an
appellate court later finds that determination erroneous, this court finds as a fact that if Ms.
Greenheart had water rights, she intentionally relinquished those rights by waiver. Ms.
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the County. Mr. Brown knew that Ms. Greenheart had indicated to the County that she did not
have water rights. Mr. Brown relied upon Ms. Greenheart's statement when he entered into a
contract for the whole Water Rights with the City of Mountain Home. That contract between the
Browns and the City of Mountain Home also had to be later amended because of Ms.
Greenheart's claim to IDWR and this lawsuit asserting that she owns a proportion of those Water
Rights.
In addressing any equitable remedies available to this court, the court has considered
these factors in whether it should just rescind the sale and place the parties back to the status quo
before the sale of the land. Since the evidence before this court is that Ms. Greenheart intended
to buy "dry" vacant land for a cost of$80,000.00 at the time of the sale, the Court's remedy must
also address her desire to invest her inheritance from her mother in land in the Mountain Home
area. In reviewing all of the evidence before the court at trial, the court has elected not to simply
rescind the sale and Warranty Deed since both parties did actually intend a sale of the 80-acre
parcel.
EQUITABLE RELIEF GRANTED AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds in favor
of the Plaintiffs on Count l, Contract Interpretation, and Count 2, Quasi-Estoppel and Waiver, in
the Complaint to Quiet Title.
Mutual mistake may be employed to modify or reform a document so as to reflect the
parties' true intent. Primary Health Network, Inc., v. State, Dep 't ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 668,
52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Reformation is available to a trial court even where not sought as part
of the original complaint. See e.g. Collins v. Parlcinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974).
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In this case, mutual mistake and the doctrines of quasi estoppel and waiver justify the
Court reforming the deed to become the deed that the parties would have made but for the
mistake. Based on the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that judgment consistent with the foregoing
be entered on Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint to Quiet Title in favor of the Plaintiffs. Counsel

-

for the Browns is to submit a proposed-form of judgment suitable for recording in the real
property records that decrees that the deed from the Browns to Dr. Greenheart is reformed
effective as of the date of that original deed so that the last paragraph of the Warranty Deed is
reformed to read:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances (specifically
excluding and reserving unto grantor all of its right, title and interest in Water
Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151) unto the said Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs
and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the
said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that
they are free from all encumbrances except as described above and that Grantor
will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
Additionally, the judgment may also be used by Plaintiff Jay Brown to file a Notice of
Change in Water Right Ownership for Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 with the State of
Idaho Department of Water Resources once this litigation has concluded.

This Court finds that Ms. Greenheart derived benefit of water supply bank lease
payments during the time this litigation was pending and the value of those l~ p1:1yments
should also be paid to the Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs are the prevailing party herein and are entitled to their costs. A final

judgment and decree incorporating these finds may be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED and DATED this 10th day of May, 2013.

Lynn Norton
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this
of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
~Hand

Michael C. Creamer
Thomas E. Dvorak
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise ID 83701-2720

Delivery
'_Facsimile
Overnight Courier

Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery

2QU.S.Mail

Facsimile
Overnight Courier

3Zi U.S. Mail

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
I n8877_l
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT
v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS A FINAL JUDGMENT
IN THIS MATTER:
1.

That final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant

on all counts and claims for relief of the Complaint;
2.

That effective January 29, 2002, the last paragraph of that certain Warranty Deed

from J. B. Brown and Christine M. Hopson-Brown, husband and wife, as grantors, to Augusta
Sayoko D. Mimoto Greenheart, as grantee, regarding certain real property located in Section 24
of Township 4 South, Range 5 East, Boise Meridian, as more particularly described in said
JUDGMENT-I
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Warranty Deed, which was executed on January 29, 2007 and recorded as Instrument No.
384017 in the real property records of Elmore County, Idaho on January 30, 2007, at 1:56 p.m. is
hereby reformed as follows. The last para~ph of said Warranty Deed is hereby reformed and
revised as follows:
To have and to hold said premises, with their appurtenances
(specifically excluding and reserving unto Grantor all of its ript
title and interest in Water Ri&ht Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151) unto
the said Grantee and to Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And
the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said
Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of said
premises, that they are free from all encumbrances except as
described above and that the Grantor will warrant and defend the
same from all lawful claims whatsoever;
3.

That a certified copy of this Judgment may be recorded in the real property

records of Elmore County, Idaho and once so recorded shall serve as prima facie evidence of the
ruling of the Court described herein;
4.

That a certified copy of this Judgment may be used by Plaintiffs to file a notice of

change in water right ownership for Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 with the State of
Idaho, Department of Water Resources, so as to recognize the Browns complete ownership of
Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 and so that the Department may change its records
accordingly; and
5.

That the Plaintiffs may file a Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees within

the appropriate time as allowed under the court rules, and if the Court grants the same any such
amounts awarded may be included in an Amended Judgment.
DATED this

~. 2013.
],Z_1tdday of~

Distn~orton
JUDGMENT-2
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I hereby certify that on this93 day of ~
, 2013, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing doc~~ the persons listed below the method
indicated:

Thomas E. Dvorak
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 388-1301

_Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Overnight Courier
Ku.s.Mail

Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID # 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1784697_1

(ll543-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the "Browns"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, hereby submits this Verified Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees as follows:

I.
A.

COSTS AS A MATIER OF RIGHT

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l), the Browns are Entitled
to Costs as a Matter of Right.

After the trial of this matter, the Browns were afforded substantially all of the relief that
they sought in their Complaint. There can be no argument that they were not the prevailing party
in this matter as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(B). Indeed, this Court held in its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of taw and Directions

for Entry of Jndgment that "Th:e Pmintim are me prevaiUng
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party herein and are entitled to their costs." 1 Accordingly, the Browns, as the prevailing party,
now submit their costs as a matter of right as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(l)(C) as follows:
1)

Court Filin2 Fees-IRCP 54{d){l)(C)(l)
$88.0(

Court Filirlg Fee 4/3/2012

2)

Fees for Service of Any Pleading or DocumentIRCP 54(d)(l)(q(2)
Service of Summons Fee 4/18/2012

3)

4)

Reasonable Costs of the Preparation of Models,
Maps, Pictures, Photographs or Other Exhibits
Admitted Into Evidence at a Hearing or Trial of an
Action
Reporting and Transcribing of a Deposition

$75.9(
$30.0(

$779.15

11/5/2012 M&M Court Reporting Deposition of
Defendant

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

$973.05

As such, the Browns are entitled to an award for their costs as a matter of right in the
amount of$973.05.

II.
A.

DISCRETIONARY COSTS

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D), the Browns Are
Entitled to Discretionary Costs.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) provides "[a]dditional items of cost not
enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon
a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should
in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." The determination of whether to
award costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)( 1)(D) is a matter of discretion with
the trial court. Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996).
The discretionary costs incurred by the Browns are set forth in detail below and were
1

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Direction for Entry of Judgment at p. 27.
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necessarily and reasonably incurred by Stanley in prosecuting claims against Greenheart and
were exceptional to this litigation as set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak filed
concurrently herewith. These are itemized as follows.
1)

2)

2)

3)
4)

5)

Serving Expense
4/30/13 Serving expenses for attempts to locate and
serve realtor Darryl Rhead, who, despite efforts to find
and serve him, could not be found
Transcript Expense
A copy of a transcript expense incurred of the trial
proceeding so as to provide an Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court
Professional Fees
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. - Premium for a title
insurance policy litigation report associated with filing a
lis pendens on the property
Recording Fees
Lis Pendens 4/3/12
Electronic Research
2/28/13 Westlaw Research
Photocopies
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS

$160.00

$385.2:

$125.0(

$16.0(
$489.13
$208.1:
$1383.S~

As such, the Browns are entitled to an award for discretionary costs in the amount of
$1,223 .5 3. To the extent any of the discretionary costs listed above are in fact costs as a matter
of right, they are hereby sought on that basis as well.
The costs claimed above as mandatory and discretionary and attorneys fees claimed
below are correct and claimed in accordance with all applicable rules. As set forth above, and in
additional detail shown in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, the Browns hereby request an
award for their costs in the total amount of $2,356.58 (which includes $973.05 total costs as a
matter of right and $1,383.53 total discretionary costs).
III.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

The fee arrangement between the Browns and Givens Pursley LLP is on a time and hour
basis. The rates of the attorneys who worked on this matter are set forth in Exhibit A to the
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Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, which is a true and correct summary of Givens Pursley's billing
records for this matter and is incorporated herein by reference. The attorneys and paralegals
whose initials appear on Exhibit A are identified in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak filed
contemporaneously herewith and incorporated herein by this reference and restated as if set forth
in full. The fees set forth in Exhibit A are true and correct and are submitted in compliance with
Rules 54(d) and 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The factors to be considered by the
Court in determining the amount of a fee award are discussed in detail in the Affidavit of
Thomas E. Dvorak filed contemporaneously herewith.
The total amount of attorneys' fees the Browns incurred in pursuing this matter amount to
$59, 193.50.
The attorneys' fees the Browns claim are reasonable and contemplated under Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 54. There are two independent substantive grounds in the present case for the
award of attorneys' fees. The first is the fact that the claims can be classed as a "commercial
transaction" in accordance with Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and the second is the language of
the parties' agreement.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides:

In any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction ..
., the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes.
Idaho Code Section 120(3). It has been held that "where a party alleges the existence of a
contract that would be a commercial transaction under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), that claim
triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees even if
no ha5tltfy under

ffie contfact is esta611sfied."

Pelerson v. Siiore, I45
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Idano 476,

197 P.3d 789 ·

(Ct. App. 2008)(citing Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 297, 982
P.3d 526, 537 (2004)).
The Complaint in this case included allegations relating to the interpretation and import
of the purchase and sale agreement in this case and the Answer and affirmative defenses did as
well. This was a large property, 60 acres, and the Defendant testified that she intended to invest
her inheritance from her mother in vacant land with low taxes. Presumably, this was to grow the
investment for profit. At the time of purchase in 2007, the Defendant owned several other pieces
of property as well and resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, and she continues to reside in Las Vegas,
Nevada, at this time, so it does not appear she intended to personally reside on the property. The
Defendant also prepared and executed a Dry Grazing Lease leasing all the property for purposes
of dry grazing back to the Plaintiffs in the transaction shortly after the purchase in 2007 and
postdated it to the date of sale. Based on these facts, it appears that this lawsuit did indeed center
on a commercial transaction and an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12120(3) is appropriate. See e.g., Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002)(where
lawsuit was made for breach of contract of sale and breach of warranty against encumbrances
over zoning violation allegedly existing in a mobile home park that was sold, court awarded
attorneys' fees under 12-120(3) saying that the "case centers on commercial transactions.").
As an additional independent basis for an award of attorneys' fees, the parties' purchase
and sale agreement contains a clear attorneys' fees provision. More specifically, paragraph 9 of
that agreement states:

If either party initiates or defends ... legal action or proceedings
which are in any way connected with this agreement, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the nonprevailing party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, including
such costs and fees on appeal. 2

2

See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 6 at paragraph 9.
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The arguments in this case were connected with an interpretation of that very agreement.
Indeed, the Court found the parties' intent in that agreement with respect to water rights was
ambiguous and looked to other evidence of the intent of the parties to determine mistake in
reforming the parties' deed.

The information in that contract was also connected with the

Court's rulings on the waiver and quasi estoppel claims in Plaintiffs' favor. Accordingly, an
award of attorneys' and costs incurred in this matter is appropriate based on the agreement of the
parties.
The following summary reflects the total amount of costs and attorneys' fees that the
Browns request an award against Defendant Greenheart:
COSTS
ATTORNEYS' FEES
TOTAL

$2,356.58
$59,193.50
$61,550.08

CONCLUSION
The Browns should, in the interest of justice and under the laws of Idaho, be awarded
their claimed costs in the amount of $2,356.58 and attorneys' fees in the amount of$59,193.50,
for a total amount of $61,550.08.

rt

DATED this~day of May, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thdmas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown
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VERIFICATION
STATEOFIDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

I, THOMAS E. DVORAK, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown
in the above-captioned action, and as such, I have knowledge of the fee and cost amounts itemized
in Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the circumstances under
which they were incurred.
I have reviewed Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees. The fees
and costs described therein are true and correct and were reasonably and necessarily incurred in the
prosecution of this action. To the best of my understanding, the fees and costs shown herein are in
compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this~ day of May, 2013.

~-Ctwt1~

NOTARYPUBLiCOR IDAHO
Residing at Meridian, Ada County
My Commission Expires: 1127/19
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~y

I hereby certify that on thisl_
of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
\/facsimile
_ Overnight Courier
VU.S.Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER - JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL
lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@3 lmorecounty.org

omasE. Dvorak
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~\

f

Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bann'1ck Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1784683_1

Lli1Ht~Y31

AH\0:22

BAaJ.\r( f~ J. t.t.LE
CLERK OF THE. COURT
OEPUT~

(11543-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the "Browns") hereby move this
Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and the
agreement of the parties, for an order awarding the Browns their reasonable costs and attorneys'
fees in obtaining judgment as the prevailing party in this matter.
This Application is supported by the Court's record and documents already on file in this
litigation, the Brown's Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, and the Affidavit of
Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of the Browns' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees, all
filed concurrently herewith, together with such other pleadings and documents as may be filed
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•

.
DATED this_ day of May, 2013.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thisJt?'dt of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
V1acsimile
_ Overnight Courier
Vlfs.Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER - JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL
lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst(@,3 lmorecounty.org

Thomas E. Dvorak
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
17114709_1
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BARJARA STEELE

CLERK OF THE COURT
DEPUTY~

(llS43-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown

IN nm DISTRICT COURT OF nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR nm
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS E.
DVORAK IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

TIIOMAS E. DVORAK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
l.

I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown

(the "Browns"), in the above-entitled action and make this Affidavit based on my personal
knowledge as such.
2.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the items listed herein are correct and

claimed in compliance wtth the appbcable iiiles.
AFFD>Avrr OF THOMAS L DVORAK IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S VERIJ'IED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND A TIORNEYS' FEES - I

578

3.

I am a partner in the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP and was principally

responsible for handling and supervising the litigation of the above-captioned matter. I have an
undergraduate degree in English with a British. Literature emphasis and a minor in business from
Boise State University obtained in 1991. I obtained ajuris doctorate degree from the University
of Idaho, College of Law, in 1994. While at law school, I worked as a referee reviewing
unemployment insmance appeals for the Idaho State Industrial Commission. After law school, I
worked as a federal law clerk for then-Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Mikel H. Williams of the
Federal District Court for the District of Idaho for two years. From 1996 to 1998, I worked for
the law offices of James J. Davis as an associate attorney with a primary focus on providing
defense to governmental entities who were sued for violation of Section 1983, i.e., deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law. From 1998 to the present, I have been engaged as
an attorney with Givens Pursley, and have been a partner with Givens Pursley LLP since 2002.
My work with Givens Pursley has been primarily commercial litigation with an emphasis on real
estate and business disputes.
4.

An accurate description and itemization of the costs incurred and the time and

activities spent in pursuing this case is attached as Exhibit A hereto (the "Itemization"). The
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Support of Costs and Attorneys' Fees filed concurrently
herewith and the Itemization are incorporated herein by this reference and restated as if set forth
in full.

5.

I billed the time I spent on this matter at the rate of $260 per hour and later in

accordance with an across-the-board yearly increase in rates at $275 per hour, which are my
usual and customary rates for services of this type. The services I rendered were necessarily
incurred by the Browns in the defense of this matter. This Affidavit is submitted in support of
Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees pursuant to Idaho RUie of Civtl Pi'ocedure
An'IDAvrr OF THOMAS E. DVORAK IN S1JnORT OF
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'

..

"

54 in recognition of the factors the Court must consider in connection with awarding a prevailing
party its attorneys' fees and costs, particularly the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3).
6.

My partner, Michael C. Creamer, has been engaged in the practice of law since
/

1989 imd is licensed in the state of Idaho to practice law since 1989. Mr. Creamer has significant
expertise in the area of water rights and was initially contacted by the Browns because of this
expertise. He billed his time in this matter at the hourly rate of$270.00.
7.

Associate attorney Alex McLaughlin and paralegals Lisa Nicholas and Eric

Nelson of the Givens Pursley LLP firm assisted on this case. Mr. McLaughlin has been licensed
as an attorney in Idaho since 2008.

His practice has been almost exclusively focused on

litigation of real property issues. Mr. McLaughlin's assistance was necessary for some lastminute intensive research before trial on mistake and other issues. Ms. Nicholas is a senior
litigation paralegal who has had many years of experience and was invaluable to the case in
terms of assisting with discovery, depositions and also with the use of exhibits at trial. Eric
Nelson is a senior real estate paralegal with our office. Mr. Nelson has a backgrmmd working in
the title insurance industry as a title insurance officer and has also been recognized previously in
two cases as qualified to testify as an expert witness on chain of title. Mr. Nelson's work in this
case related to confirming that there were no intervening parties between 2007 and 2012 that
otherwise would be required to be joined as parties to this lawsuit in adjudicating the water
rights. Services rendered by this associate and paralegals were necessarily incurred by the
Browns in the litigation of this matter, and their rates are consistent with the rates of the
associates and paralegals at other firms in the local area with which I am familiar.

Rate

information for these individuals is shown on the enclosed Itemization. This Itemization was
prepared from the billing records of Givens Pursley LLP. The record for matter 11543-2 is the
file that was set up for the sale of water rights from the Browns to the
AmDAVJF OF THOMAS E. DVORAK IN SUPPORT OF
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City of Mountain Home.

'

'

It reflects some time by attorney Michael C. Creamer in January and February of 2012. When
there was doubt as to whether Mr. Creamer's work was directly related to Greenheart's contrary
claim or if it was otherwise related to the sale of water rights in general, I put the time down but
did not seek reimbursement for any such fees for the court. The second matter, matter 11543-3,
is the billing matter that was set up for the quiet title action against Defendant Greenheart. It was
initiated in March of2012 by our office when it was deemed necessary to file suit.
8.

The work of Lisa Nicholas, paralegal, on this case primarily consisted of

document production in discovery and trial preparation and her rate reflects her skill and
experience in this area.

Rule 54(e)(3) Facton for Attomeys' Fees Award
9.

Time and Labor Reguired.

This matter arose out of a purchase and sale agreement and a subsequence deed of
conveyance of real property that was severed from a larger parcel, and a dispute over whether the
contemplated sale included a conveyance of a pro rata portion of water right nos. 61-2188 and
61-7151.
Preparing for the Browns' motion for summary judgment, and opposing and responding
to Greenheart' s motion for summary judgment, as well as preparing for trial, required
researching the applicable law, extensive legal analysis, coordinating with witnesses to provide
affidavits to establish undisputed facts, and drafting the necessart briefing and affidavits, and
taking the deposition of Defendant.
The trial of this matter occurred on March Sand 6, 2013. Just prior to trial, the Browns
filed and argued a Motion in Limine to prohibit testimony of Greenheart's experts related to the
purchase and sale agreement and related to value of the property. The drafting and arguing of the
Motion in Limine and the two days of trial required extensive preparation involving legal
AFFIDAVIT OF TlloMAS E. DVORAK IN SUPPORT OF
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..
research and analysis, document review, exhibit and witness preparation, and argument
outlining.
10.

Novelty and Difficulty of Questions.

The issues in this matter required an

understanding and application of water law and real estate law.
11.

Skill Requisite to Perform Leaal Services and Experience of Counsel. Over the

last 13 years, my practice has focused on the litigation of commercial and real property disputes.

My experience in these types of matters allowed me to analyze the facts and law applicable to
this case and develop the legal theories that led to my client prevailing in summary judgment.
12.

Prevailina Charm for Like

Work-

As an attorney in Boise, Idaho, who

represents clients throughout the state of Idaho in both state and federal court, I am familiar with
the current billing rates of attorneys with practices similar to mine. The rates I charge and the
rates charged by the other attorneys and paralegals at Givens Pursley LLP who worked on this
case are consistent with the rates of other professionals with whom I am familiar and who
practice in litigation in the state of Idaho.
13.

Fee Arranaement. The fee arrangement between the Browns and Givens Pursley

LLP was based on time and hour basis.
14.

Time Limitations. None.

15.

The Results Obtained. In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Direction

for Entry of Judgment on May 10, 2013, this Court found in favor of the Browns and against
Greenheart. This Court determined that a mutual mistake justifying reformation of the deed had

been shown by clear and convincing evidence, that the statute of limitations applicable to mutual
mistake did not apply, that the same relief was also justified under quasi estoppel and waiver.
These were precisely and substantially the relief that the Browns sought to achieve at the
beginning of the case.
AnmAvrr OJ THoMAS E. DVORAK IN SUl'PORT OJ
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16.

The Undesirability of the Case. This case was not undesirable, except insofar as

the difficulty in trying a case relative to the value of the water rights in question versus costs of
taking a case all the way to trial potentially made it undesirable in that the amount at stake could
have been close to the costs of trying the case through trial and potentially appeal.
17.

The Nature and Length of Relationship with the Client. Givens Pursley LLP has

provided legal advice and counsel to the Browns for a number of years on various matters.
18.

Awards in Similar Cases. I am not specifically aware of an award of fees and

costs in a similar case with similar timelines, facts and issues.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

£4#}(

Thomas E. Dvorak

"rt'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this)I' day of May, 2013.

Notary Public
Residing at Meridian, Ada County
My Commission Expires 1127119
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CERTD'ICATE or SERVICE

I hereby certify that on tbis?O-.day of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing docmnent to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
'-Prlcsimile
Overnight Courier

-C.:U.:S.Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@3Jmorecounty.ora

Thomas E. Dvorak
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!!

Jay B. Brown I fity of Mountain Homo ( 11~ I 2 )

Date
TimikeeDer
1/24120t2 Mic~el C. Creamer

Rate

Hours

Amount

DescriDUon

0.20

270.00

0.00 Telephone call with J. Brown re: water right agreement

1/2612012 Mic ael C. Creamer
1/30/2012 Mic ael C. Creamer
2n12012 Mic ael C. Creamer

0.30
1.20
0.80

270.00
270.00
270.00

218/2012 Micttael C. Creamer

0.80

270.00

0.00 Initial review of documents received from J. Brown.
0.00 Meeting with Jay and Christine Brown; review draft Purchase and Sale Agreement.
0.00 Telephone conference with J. Friedly; draft Special Warranty Deed, Quitclaim Deed and
Consent to Transfer; review correspondence from J. Friedly.
0.00 Telephone conference with J. Brown; review and revise draft Purchase and Sale Agreement

2116/2012 Micltael C. Creamer

0.60

270.00

2121/2012 Mictlael C. Creamer

3.30

270.00

2/2212012 Mic~ael C. Creamer
2/2212012 Mic ael C. Creamer
212212012 Mic ael C. Creamer
2/23/2012 Mic ael C. Creamer
Totals for Mich,el C. Creamer

0.30
0.50
0.30
0.30

270.00
270.00
270.00
270.00

CJ1
00
O">

0.00 Review Purchase and Sale Agreement; office conference regarding same; draft
correspondence to J. Brown.
891.00 Review IDWR water right backfile; telephone conference with T. Brown; review
correspondence from Browns; draft letter to Ms. Greenheart; revise Consent and forward
letter and Consent to clients for review.
81.00 Finalize and send correspondence to A. Greenheart.
135.00 Correspond with clients; finalize letter to A. Greenheart.
81. 00 Finalize and forward letter to A. Greenheart.
81.00 Teleohone conference with J. Fried
1,269.00

Jay B. Brown I Quiet Title • A. Greenheart ( 11543 I 3 )
~

Rate

Hours

Date
3/1412012
311912012

0.10
0.50

Amount

270.00
270.00

DescnDtion

Office confel'et'lee re: qLliet title~aUit.
135.00 Telephone conference with D. Smith at IDWR re: revising IDWR water right database
27~00

re: ownership. Review draft Complaint; obtain copies of vesting deeds to Browns.
3120/2012

ichael C. Creamer

3.80

270.00

3/2112012

ichael C. Creamer

0.50

270.00

3/2312012

ichael C. Creamer

0.50

270.00

3/2612012

ichael C. Creamer

0.60

270.00

0.30
0.60

270.00
270.00

ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer

0.50
0.50

270.00
270.00

8/312012
8/812012
8/1412012
9/1912012
10/2212012

ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.

Creamer
Creamer
Creamer
Creamer
Creamer

0.20
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.40

270.00
270.00
270.00
270.00
270.00

10/26/2012
11/1312012

ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer

3.00
0.60

0.00
270.00

11/1412012
11/1512012
11120/2012
11121/2012

ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.

Creamer
Creamer
Creamer
Creamer

0.50
0.30
0.40
2.10

270.00
270.00
270.00
270.00

12/6/2012

ichael C. Creamer

1.50

300.00

1217/2012

ichael C. Creamer

1.80

300.00

3/27/2012
312812012
312912012
11.116/2612012

~

1,026.00 Review and revise draft Complaint; telephone conference with J. Homan at IDWR:
review and revise agreement; f;OfTMpondence to J. Friedly.
135.00 Forward draft Complaint to dients for review and comment; review IDWR split of
Brown's water rights; correspondence with IDWR to correct splits.
135.00 Telephone conference with J. Brown; coordinate obtaining deeds; correspondence
IDWR.
162.00 Telephone conference with J. Brown; review and revise Complaint and forward to
clients.
81.00 Review litigation guarantee and d-.cls.
162.00 Prepare exhibits; tetephone conference with J. Brown; telephone conference with J.
Friedly; forward IDWR letters to J. Friedly.
135.00 Meeting with J. Brown to obtain signature on Complaint
135.00 Review discovery responses; office <XHlference with T. Dvorak and telephone
conference with J. Friedly re: same.
54.00 Office conference regarding deposing Augusta Greenheart
81.00 Coordinate deposition at Jay Friedly's office.
27
Review status of deposition.
27.00 Review Scheduling Order.
108.00 Telephone call to D. Smith at Idaho Department of Water Resources; office conference
re: potential expert witnesses.
0.00 Attend Greenheart deposition (no charge)
162.00 Telephone conference with Paul Herrington at SRBA Court regarding jurisdiction of
SRBA Court over quiet title action; office conference regarding same.
135.00 Office conference re: motion for summary judgment
81.00 Initial review of motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits.
108.00 Review Brown Affidavit and Realtor's Affidavit re: land values.
567.00 Review and edit Brown Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment
450.00 Review and revise Motion for Summary Judgment; review and revise Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
540.00 Review, revise and serve response brief on Motion for Summary Judgment

.oo

1211112012 Nlichael C. Creamer

0.90

300.00

12117/2012 Nlichael C. Creamer

0.40

300.00

1211912012 iichael C. Creamer
12120/2012 ichael C. Creamer

0.80
4.80

300.00
300.00

1212712012 ilchaol c. Creamer

1.50
4.40
6.30
3.50
2.50

300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00

1213112012 ilchaol C. Creamer

2.60
0.40
2.80
4.00
5.00

300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00

21412013 iichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer

0.80
0.30
0.40

300.00
300.00
300.00

211212013 tichael C. Creamer
211812013 ichael C. Creamer

0.30
0.70

300.00
300.00

2120/2013 !Michael C. Creamer

0.30

300.00

0.60
0.20
0.40
0.20
0.30

300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00
300.00

0.50
0.60
2.50

260.00
260.00
260.00

12128/2012
1212912012
12130/2012
1213112012

1/3/2013
1/412013
1/612013
1n12013

iiJ1

""
co

216/2013
21812013

212112013
212612013
2127/2013
212812013
3/612013
Totals for Mi

ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.
ichael C.

Creamer
Creamer
Creamer
Creamer

ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
ichael C. Creamer
aal C. Creamer - Working

3/1412012 homas E. Dvorak
3/1612012 homas E. Dvorak
3117/2012 homas E. Dvorak

270.00 Office conference regarding discovery responses; review correspondence with City of .·
Mountain Home: telephone conference with J. Friedly. review, revise and forward
Protective Agreement
120.00 Review pleadings; office conference regarding Reply Brief of cross-motions for
summary judgment
240.00 Review Western State decisions on appurtenancy and conveyances.
1,440.00 Telephone conference with V. Villegas; review filings by V. Villegas; review, revise.
finalize and serve Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment
450.00 Research western states decisions regarding "appurtenancy" of water right&.
1,320.00 Continued research regarding •appurtenances" deei&ions in neighboring states.
1,890. 00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike.
1,050.00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
750.00 Finalize, file and serve Reply Brief and Response Brief on Cross-Motions for Sum
Judgment
780.00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike.
120.00 Office conference regarding oral argument on summary judgment
840.00 Begin preparation for oral argument on Motion for Summary Judgment
1,200.00 Review briefs and prepare argument on Motion for Summary Judgment
1,500.00 Prepare for oral argument; travel to Mountain Home; argue summary judgment motion;
return to Boise.
240.00 Review Order on Summary Judgment; office conference regarding same.
90.00 Attention to decision on Summary Judgment
120.00 Telephone conference with district court clerk; review missing pages to summary
judgment order.
90.00 Office conference regarding mediation I trial strategy.
210.00 Review court decision on Motion for Summary Judgment; draft memo to TEO and file
regarding proving mistake in deed.
90.00 Office conference regarding response to Greenheart pleadings and review T. Ovo,
correspondence to clients regarding same.
180.00 Coordinate filing of responsive pleadings; locate aerial photos as potential exhibits.
60.00 Telephone conference regarding trial preparation issues.
120.00 Review trial testimony strategy.
60.00 Review Greenheart pre-trial motions.
90.00 Office conference r ardin status of testimonv at trail.
17,793.00
130.00 [MCC quiet title] Office conference Mike Creamer regarding facts of case.
156.00 Telephone conference with Jim Brown; office conference regarding same.
650.00 Draft quiet title complaint

f

c.J1
00

c..O

311912012 omas E. Dvorak
3/20/2012 homas E. Dvorak
3/21/2012 homas E. Dvorak
3/23/2012 homas E. Dvorak

1.00
0.60
0.50
0.40

260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00

4/12/20121homas E. Dvorak
4/27/2012 homas E. Dvorak

r••

0.30
0.30

260.00
260.00

4130/2012
E. Dvorak
5/11/2012 homas E. Dvorak
5/16/2012 homas E. Dvorak

0.10
0.50
0.70

260.00
260.00
260.00

5/18/20121homas E. Dvorak
6/1112012 homas E. Dvorak

0.80
0.30

260.00
260.00

6/13/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak
612712012 homas E. Dvorak

0.30
1.20

260.00
260.00

6/29/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak

0.70

260.00

81312012
E. Dvorak
8/6/2012 homas E. Dvorak
81812012 homas E. Dvorak

0.40
0.40
0.50

260.00
260.00
260.00

8/9/2012 ihomas E. Dvorak

1.80

260.00

8/10/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak
8/14/2012 homas E. Dvorak

0.20
0.30

260.00
260.00

0.30
0.20
0.40
0.20
0.50
0.40
4.60
0.10
7.40
0.50

260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00

lhomas

8/17/2012
8/24/2012
8127/2012
8/2812012
9/19/2012
9/1912012
10/24/2012
10/2512012
10/26/2012
10/29/2012

homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak

Review and revise draft complaint.
.·
Office conference regarding revisions to complaint
Review and revise draft complaint and summons.
Review and revise complaint; office conference regarding same; office conference
regarding locating process server.
78.00 Office conference regarding service.
78.00 Receive and review e-mail from Gary Tanner regarding appearance and service on
Greenheart.
26.00 Draft email to client to update on status.
130.00 Review answer; draft report to client.
182.00 Telephone conference with Jay Brown regarding strategy and goals in case; draft initial
discovery outline.
208.00 Review and revise discovery; telephone message to opposing counsel.
78.00 Office conference regarding status and latest research on cases involving extrinsic
evidence to prove reservation of water rights from grant of deed.
78.00 Receive and review notice of filing discovery service.
312.00 Receive and review discovery responses; office conference regarding strategy on
same.
182.00 Telephone conference Jay Brown regarding strategy; draft letter to Jay regarding
discovery and strategy; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding same.
104.00 Office conference regarding status.
104.00 Review and revise letter regarding deposition and deposition ducas tecum.
130.00 Finalize notice of deposition of Greenheart; communicate with Vactor Villigas regarding
same.
468.00 Communicate with Victor Villegas regarding deposition; legal research on statute of
limitations; draft status report to client; office conference regarding same.
52.00 Receive and review notice of change of address of Villegas.
78.00 Office conference regarding status; receive and review letter regarding setting of
deposition.
78.00 Draft status update and e-mail regarding consent to deposition dates.
52.00 Review status of continued deposition.
104.00 Prepare stipulation for scheduling.
52.00 Finalize and file stipulation for scheduling and planning.
130.00 Receive and review scheduling order; forward same to client with analysis.
104.00 Receive and review scheduling order; draft email to clients updating status.
1, 196.00 Review discovery and outline deposition of Greenhart.
26.00 Prepare for deposition; e-mail client
1,924.00 Prepare for and take deposition of Augusta Greenhart.
130.00 Office conference regarding deposition and strategy; telephone conference with Jay
Brown.
260.00
156.00
130. 00
104.00

1.50

260.00

111512012
E. Dvorak
11/6/2012 homas E. Dvorak
1117/2012 homas E. Dvorak

0.50
1.40
2.80

260.00
260.00
260.00

11/8/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak

1.50

260.00

11/912012 lhomas E. Dvorak

0.80

260.00

11/1212012 Thomas E. Dvorak

1.00

260.00

11/1912012 Thomas E. Dvorak

4.40

260.00

11/20/2012 Thomas E. Dvorak

2.40

260.00

1112112012 homas E. Dvorak
121712012 homas E. Dvorak

0.70
0.80

260.00
260.00

0.50

260.00

12/1412012 homas E. Dvorak

0.80

260.00

1211612012
12/1912012
12120/2012
1212212012
12/2712012

Dvorak
Dvorak
Dvorak
Dvorak
Dvorak

2.10
0.40
0.70
0.30
0.40

260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00

12130/2012
E. Dvorak
1213112012 homas E. Dvorak
1/812013 homas E. Dvorak

0.90
0.90
0.40

260.00
260.00
275.00

1/10/2013 lhomas E. Dvorak
1/1812013 homas E. Dvorak

0.40
0.40

275.00
275.00

1112/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak

romas

"""

<.O 12/1112012
0

homas E. Dvorak

ras

E.
homas E.
homas E.
homas E.
homas E.

romas

390.00 Telephone conference with Karla Post regarding potential expert testimony; draft
affidavit of Karla Postdraft e-mail to Karla Post telephone conference Jay Brown;
telephone message Vidor VIiiegas.
130.00 Telephone conference Terri Manduca regarding potential testimony.
364.00 Draft summary judgment legal research regarding same.
728.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment legal research
regarding same.
390.00 Receive and review signature on agreement to extend expert witness deadlines and
execute and file same; draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment

..

208.00 Participate in telephone conference with Judge Norton; telephone measage Darin
Rhead regarding documents.
260.00 Receive and review first round of discovery from Plaintiff; respond to same;
conference Terri Manduca.
1, 144.00 Draft Memorandum in Support of motion for summary judgment draft affidavit of
Thomas E. Dvorak; legal l'9$84lrch on laches;telephone conference with Terri Manduca
(2x); draft affidavit of Terri; draft expert witness d~.
624.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment; draft affidavit of Jay
Brown.
182.00 Office conference regarding sqatus and strategy; respond to e-mail from client
208.00 Review and revise discovery responses; telephone conference Jay Brown regarding
same (2x).
130.00 Telephone conference with Victor Villegas regarding di&covery. office conference
regarding same.
208.00 Office conference regarding discovery. legal research on opposition to summary
judgment brief.
546. 00 Legal research on opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft same.
104.00 Receive and review expert witness disclosure of Defendant
182.00 Review and revise memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment
78.00 Review defendanrs motion to strike and related filings.
104.00 Office conference regarding drafting reply brief in support of summary judgment; review
brief filed by Greenheart and motion to strike.
234.00 Review and revise reply brief; legal research on objective manifestation of intent
234.00 Draft portion of reply brief; office conference regarding same.
110.00 Office conference regarding status; telephone conference Jay Brown regarding
proceeding to trial.
110.00 Review witness disclosure list; office conference regarding status.
110.00 Finalize witness disclosure; receive and review same from Vidor VIiiegas.

CJ't
C.D
I'-

2/812013 lJlomas E. Dvorak

0.80

275.00

2/11/2013 llhomas E. Dvorak

0.50

275.00

2/15/2013 llhomas E. Dvorak

0.40

275.00

2120/2013 lhomas E. Dvorak

3.20

275.00

212212013 lhomas E. Dvorak

3.80

275.00

2125/20131homas E. Dvorak
212612013 homas E. Dvorak

0.50
3.40

275.00
275.00

212712013 lhomas E. Dvorak

1.50

275.00

212812013 Thomas E. Dvorak

2.70

275.00

2.30
2.50

275.00
275.00

9.70
5.50
0.60
1.30
1.50
3.10
1.80

275.00
275.00
275.00
275.00
275.00
275.00
275.00

0.50
1.40
1.80

275.00
275.00
275.00

0.50

275.00

31112013

~E.

Dvorak

3/4/2013 homas E. Dvorak
3/512013
3/612013
312812013
4/412013
4n12013
4/812013
5/14/2013

511512013

homas E. D1Jorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak
homas E. Dvorak

romas

E. Dvorak
5/1612013 homas E. Dvorak
512712013 homas E. Dvorak

5/2812013 homas E. D'lorak
T9tai. for Th maa E. Dvorak - Working

220.00 Telephone conference with client regarding import of decision and mediation
potential;draft e-mail to opposing counsel regarding same; office conference regarding
elements of mistake and quasi &Stoppel.
137.50 Review status; telephone message to opposing counsel regarding mediation and trial;
office conference regarding mediation.
11 o.oo Telephone conference Jay Brown regarding status; office conference regarding
mistake.
880.00 Draft opposition to motion for reconsideration and motion to shorten time; legal
research regarding same; draft witness list
1,045.00 Prepare for and travel to Mountain Home for hearing and pretrial; Meeting with Jay
Brown; participate in pretrial.
137.50 Telephone conference with Terry Manduca regarding potential testimony.
935.00 Review and summarize Greenheart Deposition; telephone conference with Jay
regarding status and decision on calling Terry Manducca;office conference
same; outline testimony; telephone conference with Christine.
412.50 Receive and review defendanfs proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law;telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding exhibits; receive and review
telephone conference Jay regarding same.
742.50 Go over exhibits and outline trial strategy and ciosing arguments; outline testimony of
greenheart; legal research for brief on admission of post contract conduct to prove
mistake.
632.50 Meeting with Jay Brown to prepare testimony; prepare for trial.
687.50 Draft pretrial brief and motion in limine and memorandum in support; telephone
conference with expert witness; prepare for trial and go over exhibits.
2,667.50 Prepare for and attend trial in Mountain Horne; travel to and from trial.
1,512.50 Prepare for trial day 2; travel to and from mountain home; participate in trial.
165.00 Receive and review transcript of trial.
357. 50 Draft revised findings of fact and conclusions of law.
412.50 Review and revise proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
852.50 Review and revise and draft amended findings of fact and conclusions of law req
495.00 Receive and review Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of
Judgment; draft judgment and letter to court; telephone conference with client regarding
same; outline and research memorandum of costs and attorneys fees.
137.50 Draft judgment and cover letter.
385.00 Draft attorneys fees application and affidavit and verified memorandum.
495.00 Review and revise and draft memorandum in support of costs and fees; legal research
on merger doctrine and attorneys fees.
137.50 Review and revise attorneys fees aoDlication.

28,005.50

..
21612013 Alex Mclaughlin

2.70

185.00

499.50 Analyze Court's Memorandum Decision re: Summary Judgment, pleadings, and the lawapplicable to mutual mistake and quasi-estoppel. Draft memorandum regarding same.
Submit to TED for review. Meeting with TEO to discuss application of my analysis to
the facts of our case.
Meeting with TEO to discuss strategy behind and validity of our argument regarding
mutual mistake.
Trial preparation with TED.
Analyze legal issue of whether evidence that a party was mistaken after the contract
was entered into bears on whether that same mistake was harbored at the time of
contracting.
Draft pre-trial memorandum addressing mutual mistake, the specificity of Defendants'
expert witness disclosures, and the rule that testimony may not be admitted to prove
the Intent of an unambiguous contract.
Meeting with TED to discuss content of ore-trial brief and trial stra

211512013 Alex Mclaughlin

0.30

185.00

55.50

212212013 xex Mclaughlin
212312013 lex Mclaughlin

0.30
1.30

185.00
185.00

55.50
240.50

212812013 Alex Mclaughlin

5.10

185.00

943.50

3/1/2013 &lex Mclaughlin

0.30

185.00

55.50
1,850.00

0.70
0.40
0.80
3.90

175.00
175.00
175.00
175.00

122.50 Research public records regarding deeds in the title chain.
70.00 Teleconference with title officer regarding deeds and lot book guarantee.
140.00 Research public records and review title documents.
682.50 l al descri tion anal sis document review. oublic records research.
1,015.00

tO
N 5/17/2012 ijisa Nicholas

3.70

135.00

7/26/2012 ~isa Nicholas
10/2412012 isa Nicholas

0.50
1.90

135.00
135.00

11/612012 llisa Nicholas

1.50

135.00

12/512012
Nicholas
121612012 isa Nicholas
1217/2012 isa Nicholas

2.10
3.70
3.20

135.00
135.00
135.00

2113/2013 llisa Nicholas

5.50

135.00

2.70
3.10
3.90

135.00
135.00
135.00

3/23/2012
3/2612012
3/2712012
6/1812012
Jotala for Eri

ric B. Nelson
ric B. Nelson
ric B. Nelson
ric B. Nelson
B. Nelson - Working

ra

ra

211412013
Nicholas
2120/2013 isa Nicholas
212112013 isa Nicholas

499.50 Review complaint and answer in preparation of first set of discovery; prepare
interrogatories, requests for production of documents and requests for admissions.
67.50 Prepare letter to opposing counsel regarding deposition of Ms. Greenheart.
256.50 Review documents provided by client and defendant to be used as exhibits at the
deposition of Defendant
202.50 Prepare second set of discovery and notice of service to defendant; prepare letter to
clerk for filing and serve upon defendant
283.50 Begin preparation of discovery responses.
499.50 Work on discovery responses.
432.00 Finalize discovery; prepare and Bates No. documents for production; prepare notice of
service of discovery.
742.50 Prepare request to supplement discovery responses and notice of service; prepare
email to expert regarding trial date; prepare trial witness list; begin preparation of trial
exhibits list and designating exhibits.
364.50 Prepare draft findings of facts and conclusions of law in preparation for trial.
418.50 Work on trial preparation, witness list, exhibit list, etc.
526.50 Work on prepare exhibits and exhibit list for trial; telephone call with expert to set time
for pretrial meeting.

..
212212013 isa Nicholas
2128/2013 isa Nicholas
3/112013
3/412013
3/512013
3/612013

isa Nicholas
isa Nicholas
isa Nicholas
isa Nicholas
Totale for Lie. Nleholae - Working

5.80
2.10
5.70
5.20
10.50
7.50

135.00
135.00
135.00
135.00
135.00
135.00

783.00 Finalize witness list; exhibit list and create binders of exhibits to be used at trial.
,,.
283.50 Prepare stipulated joint exhibit list; prepare letter to Idaho Real Estate Commission to
serve Daryl Rhead; telephone call with Idaho Real Estate Commission regarding
service upon agent
769.50 Work on trial preparation.
702.00 Work on electronic trial presentation an loading of exhibits.
1,417. 50 Attend trial.
1.012.50 Attend trial.
9,261.00

Total feq fo~Jay B. Brown I Quiet Tltla ·A. Greanhaart
(11543 / 3)
Total feq fod11543·2

57,924.50

Total Fees

59,193.50

Total Costs

2,356.68

Total Fees and Costs for Jay B. Brown I Quiet Title • A.

U'I
CJ.')

w

1,269.00

61,560.08

~

·;~
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID # 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1793602_1

'
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CLERK Of THE COURT
OEPUT~

(11543-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE.DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA
AND WITHDRAWAL OF PORTION
OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

Comes now, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and hereby give notice of
Errata in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak.
Specifically, the entry for 2.6 hours of work by Michael C. Creamer ("MCC'') totaling
$780.00 on 12131/2012 on the attachment to the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak ("Affidavit") was a
typographical error in that all of the activities described within that entry and within the earlier
12/31/2012 entry of 2.5 hours would have taken place within either the 2.5 or 2.6 hour block of time
according to the memory of Mr. Creamer. Mr. Creamer did not have a chance to review the
Affidavit and attachment until after this Affidavit was filed. Accordingly, giving the benefit of the
doubt to our clients, Givens Pursley LLP has written down the amount of the outstanding bill by

VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAWAL OF
PORTION OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES -1
1793602_1 [11543-3]
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2.6 hours, $780.00, and now formally amends the Affidavit and the corresponding last page of the
Verified Memorandum of Cost and Attorneys Fees ("Memorandum'') as follows:
The following summary reflects the total amount of costs and
attorneys' fees that the Browns request an award against Defendant
Greenheart:

s 2,356.58

COSTS
AITORNEYS' FEES
TOTAL

$58,413.50
$60,770.08

CONCLUSION
The Browns should, in the interest ofjustice and under the
laws ofldaho, be awarded their claimed costs in the amount of
$2,356.58 and attorneys' fees in the amount of$58,413.50, for a total
amount of $60,770.08.

Other than as set forth above, the Affidavit and Memorandum are and remain true and correct
and in effect as of the original date they were filed.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this

~

day of June, 2013.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at Meridian, Ada County
My Commission Expires: //- So-~17

VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAWAL OF
PORTION OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES • 2
1793602_1 [11543-3]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5 t y of June, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
~acsimile

_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@3lmorecoµnty.org

VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAWAL OF
PORTION OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES -3
1793602_1 [11543-3]
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No. 5593

st Culton Ave

P. 2/6

F\LEfJ

Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villcpl [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LADY LAwomCES
141 B. C1t'1toa Avt.
Merldtaa. m83642
Boise. Idaho 83702
Oftlcc (208) 908-4415
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@lmton-Jaby.com

'LU\3 JUH \ 3 PH 2: O~
BARBARA SlL£.lET

lH~~*
OEPUT''fCJ'

CLERK Of

A.ttontl)'I/or Df/lntlant
IN TllE DISTRICT COVR.T or THE ro~TB J'UDICIAL DISTRICT 01'

THI STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE
JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BR.OWN. Husband and Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

' MBMORA.NDVM IN
OPPOSmONTO
PLAINTD'n' APPLICATION
FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES

v.

AUOUSTASAYOKOMIMOTO
OREBNHBAR.T, an individual,

Defendant.

Defendant, Aupata Sa)')ko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and tbroqb. her attorneys of record,

Victor Villegu and Borton Lakey Law OtBcee, submits this Memorandum h1 Opposition to
Plaintitfs' .Application for Costl and Attom.eya' F111 filed May 30, 2013.
L

The Plaintitli ("Browm") seek m award of attorney feet bued on Idaho Code

f 12·

120(3) end punwmt to an attorney fees provision eontaJned h1 the Real Bltate Purcbuo and Sale

Jqpeement. N set fbrm wwwe fiJHy !Jelaw, tile Browm ifti mt entttted tu m award ot atmmey
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLA.lNTIFFS'

APPUCATION f~ COSTS ANDATIORNBYS' FBES· l

.
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·. Jun.

13. 2013 2:01 PM

No. 5593

st Culton Ave

P. 3/6

feet. in thia matt• because: (1) this cue did not involve a 'commarcial transaction' brinains the

matter ads Idaho Code I 12·120(3) and; (2) the contraotual provtmna in the Real Bstat•
Purchue ml Sale are inapplicable.

U.

ABQJJMINt

A. Tllen 11 ao •commerctal tnmactloa" la tbll cue and tlaenfon attontyt fMI cuaot
be awarded oder Idaho Code 112-120(3).

Idaho Code f 12-120(3) allowa i>r 111 award of attormy fill to the pnsYlillns pany in a

civil acdon to reoo\11." "in any commercial tramaction." A commercial tramaction includet all
tnmsactiom except tboae fbr personal or household purpow. l.C.

I 12-120(3). Jn detemrinin1

whither attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. f ll-120(3), the Idaho Supreme Court bu

conduc=tod a two-step analylil: "(1) there must be a 09mmercial transectio11 that !s intearaI to the
claim; ml (2) the oommercia1 tramaction must be the bait upon which recovery i8 toqht."
Gamv v. Pov.y, 1S1 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011). hcmtly the Idaho Supreme

Court in Carrillo v. Bols11h Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256, (2012) baa held that,••...

morder fbr a ttamaction to be commercial. each party to the tramaction must enter the
~ mr I commercia1 purpoae." Id. at Idaho 7!6.
In this case. the evidence in the record and in partiCulat this Court'• fJndma1 of fict and

conclusions demonstrate that thit ouo did not involve a commercial trmtaction. With respect to

Orec:nbcart'a ability to dis a well, thia Court held that "At thotimeofthe Ille, Idaho Code If 42227 and 42-111 provided that no water right wu necesaery to operate: a well i>r

~meatic

purpo•... u a matter of law, there WU and ii alepl meam too~ a well." Ftndlnp oj'Fact
and Conclu.slon.r ofLaw PS. 16. To now hold that a "commercial trmaction" wu involved in

thii cue wo\ild coiiiida t1iil Court's conciuaion.
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The Browna a1ao arp that beeause Oreeaheart prepared and executed a dry arazjna

lease with the Browm· that this conduct wu indicative of this lawsuit involvina a commercial

tramaodon. On the contrary, the purpo11 of the dry srazina 1eaM wu solely to receive a
reduction in taxes m:l not to receive any Income. Thia Court made the apeciflc findiq that the
leue wu to pt a tax reduction in Pindiq of Pact No. 23. Perhaps the molt telllq lian that the
dry arazjna lease waa not intended to mate a profit ia the dry srazina lease it811£ A review of

tho hue, mmbd u Plaintift'1 Bxhibit 11, shows than there ii no monetary consideration to be
paid by the Browm tbr the dry srazina lease.

Thia lawsuit did not involve a commercJal transaction mi therefore attorney fee• ere not
awardabie under Idaho Code f 12·120(3).

B. Then II ao applicable contractual provllloa tlaat allowl for ID award of attorney~ fee1.
As rm independent basis fur rm award of attorney fees, the Brown.I rely on Parqraph 9 of
'

the RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale

Aareement (Plaintiff"s Bxlubit 6) that

reada:

t. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If either party initiates or detendl any arbitration or lep1
action or proceedins which are in any way connected with this Aareemem. the prevailina
party shall be entitled to recover tom the non-prevailins party reuonable costs and
attorney feel, including such costs and fisea on appeal.
Paragraph 9 of the Purchase and Sale Asreement cannot form tho buil b' an award of
attorney

fees by this Court tbr two reasons. Pint, the sraveman 'of this lawsuit wu the

interpretation of the Warranty Deed not the interpretation of en1brcement of the Purchase and
Sale Agreement. In &ct this Court recopized that the terms of the contract were nmpd with
the Wamnty Deed. Sa Mmorandum Dectllon On Summary Judgment Pl: 7. The Warranty
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i

Deed doea not contain any similar attom:y fcea provision u the Purchase am Salo Agremnent
and thntbre there ii no contnct provilion that allows an award of attorney fcea.

Second. eva if thia Court were to qree that the attorney feet provision of the Purchase
and Sale Apement were to apply, that contractual provision ia too late. A.a Oreenheart raiaed in
her Motion tbr Summary 1udament, tho statute of limitationa on an action i>unded upon a

written contrict ii five years. J.C.

I 5·216. Here, the PurcbaN and Sale Apement and

Counterofti:r compriae the contmot 'bctwem the parties. Tho ''U-13 Colinteroffer" wu Jut
siped OD January 9, 2007. Tho Complaint WU !led OD April 9, 2012. To be timely, the lawsuit

should have been filed on or before January 9, 2012.

.

Th.e:refi>re. if thia action tNly involved tho

interpretation of the Pmcbaae and Sale Apiem.ent which would trigar the attorney feet

provisM>n of Parqraph 9 this lawsuit it too late and theretbre attorney fees cannot bo awarded.

m.

CONCLUSION

Bued upon the arguments above, the Brown's request tbr attorney fcca in this matter

should be denied.

DATBD this 13*dayof1une, 2013.

BORTON LAKEY LAW OPPICES

y~r_~

By

Victor Villeps
A.ttomey,r for Dr/endant
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QBmICAD or suvxc1
I HEREBY CERTlPY that on this 13* day of June, 2013, a true and comet CIJP'I of the

fbresoina document wu ICVld by ftnt-clm mail, poatap prepaid. am addressed to; by t.x
tranmiuJon to9 by overniaht deliva'y to; or by pencmally deliverins to or leavina with a penon

in o1wp of the ofBoe u indicated beJow:

· [ ) U.S. Mail

MiebaolC.Creamer
Thoma B. Dvorak
GIVENS PUl.SLEY W
601 Welt BIDDOck Street
P.0. Box 2720 ·
Boilet 11> 83701·272~
Telephone: (208) 388·1200
FIClimilo: (208) 388-1300

[X] Fax

[ ] Overniaht Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
APPUCATION FOR. COSTS AND AtTORNE'YS' FEES· 5

601

Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villegas [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES
141 E. Carlton Ave.
Meridian, ID 83642
Boise, Idaho 83702
Office: (208) 908-441 S
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borton-lakey.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, Husband and Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Respondents,

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JAY BROWN AND CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, PO BOX 2720, BOISE,
IDAHO 83701-2720, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, by and

through her counsel of record, Borton Lakey Law Offices, appeals against the above-named
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's Judgment entered on May 23,
2013.
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2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on the grounds that

the orders and judgment descnbed in paragraph 1 above are appealable pursuant to l.A.R.
1 l(a)(l).

3.

Following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which Appellant

intends to assert. This list of issues shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on
appeal The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of Elmore made
the following errors of law:
(a)

Did the district court err in permitting Respondents to assert "mutual

mistake" without having pled that cause of action in their Complaint?
(b)

Did the district court err in concluding that the Complaint met the

requirements of pleading mistake with particularity as required by IRCP 9(b)?
(c)

Did the district court err finding that Respondent's cause of action was not

barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code Sections 5-224 and/or 5-216?
(d)

Did the district court err finding that Respondent's cause of action was not

barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code Section 5-218?
(e)

Did the district court err in allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret the

Warranty Deed?
(t)

Did the district court err in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement

was ambiguous?
(g)

Did the district court err in excluding Appellant's expert witnesses?

(h)

Did the district court err in finding that Respondents were able to meet the

"clear and convincing" standard necessary for finding mutual mistake?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

Page 2 of7
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5.

Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript:
(a)

Summary Judgment Hearing on January 7, 2013;

(b)

Hearing on Motion to Shorten Time and Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri Manduca on January 7, 2013;

(c)

Status Conference on January 7, 2013;

(d)

Pre-Trial Conference on February 22, 2013;

(e)

Hearing on Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion in Limine on March

5, 2013; and
Trial testimony on March 5 and 6, 2013.

(f)
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR:

Description

No.

Filed

1

04-05-12

Comnlaint

2

04-05-12

Summons

3

05-09-12

Answer

4

08-13-12

Order for Scheduling Conference and Order Re: Motion Practice

5

08-28-12

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

6

09-17-12

Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings

7

11-05-12

Motion to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines

8

11-05-12

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines

9

11-05-12

Agreement to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines and Withdrawal of Motion

10

11-15-12

Defendant's Motion for

11

11-15-12

Memorandum in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for S

12

11-15-12

Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

13

11-16-12

Affidavit of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart in Support of Motion for
et

14

12-10-12

·-~ ..--~-v

s...

i Judgment
y

Judgment

Ju.dument

Motion for

s.

.y

Judgment
Page 3 of7
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Description

No.

Filed

15

12-10-12

Affidavit of Jay R. Brown in Sunnort of Motion for S·

16

12-10-12

Affidavit of Terri LaRae Manduca

17

12-10-12

Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of Motion for Summary
Judament

18

12-19-12

Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses

19

12-21-12

Memorandum in Om>osition to Plaintiffs' Motion for S

20

12-21-12

Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Plaintiff's
s". .J Judament

21

12-21-12

Affidavit of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart in Support of Defendant's
Om>osition to s....... :r Judament

22

12-21-12

Affidavit of Kenneth Brush in Support of Defendant's Opposition to
s., .. ; Judlllllent

23

12-21-12

Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and
Terri LaRae Manduca

24

12-21-12

Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Their Motion to Strike
Portions of Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca

25

12-21-12

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca

26

12-24-12

Memorandum in Om>osition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judlllllent

27

12-28-12

Reoly in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for s- ,.,;---y Judlllllent

28

12-31-12

Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca

29

01-18-13

Defendant's Disclosure of Lay Witnesses

30

01-31-13

·Order Denying Summary Judgment on Court I and Granting in Part
Su.l..U.LU.QI.;; Judlllllent for Defendant on Count II

31

02-15-13

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration

32

02-15-13

Memorandum in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration

33

02-15-13

Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake

34

02-15-13

Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion in Limine

35

02-21-13

Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time
to Hear Motion for Reconsideration and Motion in Limine

36

02-21-13

Motion to Amend

j/

U:l-:ll-U

Motion to :snorten lune to Hear Mot10n to Amend

NOTICE OF APPEAL

'"'

""

Y

Judlllllent

y

Judament

Page4 of7

•

•

f

f

Deseripdon

No.

Filed

38

02-22-13

Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit List

39

02-22-13

Plaintiffs' Trial Witness List

40

02-22-13

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findina of Fact and Conclusions of Law

41

02-25-13

Defendant's Proposed Findina of Fact and Conclusions of Law

42

02-25-13

Defendant's Trial Witness List

43

02-25-13

Defendant's Trial Exlu"bit List

44

02-27-13

Defendant's Amended Trial Exhibit List

45

03-04-13

Pre-Trial BriefRe: Post Conveyance Evidence of Mutual Mistake and
Purchase Aueement as Evidence of Mistake

46

03-04-13

Motion in Limine

47

03-04-13

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine

48

03-04-13

Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion in Limine

49

04-08-13

Defendant's First Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

so

04-08-13

Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

51

05-13-13

Findina of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Jud2Illent

52

05-23-13

Jud2Illent

53

05-31-13

Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees

54

05-31-13

Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees

55

05-31-13

Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of Plaintiffs' Verified
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees

56

06-07-13

Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of Portion of Claimed Attorneys'
Fees

57

06-13-13

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and
Attorneys' Fees

7.

The undersigned hereby certified:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Penny Tardiff
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702-7300
March.5, 2013
February 22, 2013
January 7, 2013
(b)

Heather Furst
clo Hon. Lynn G. Norton
Elmore County Courthouse
150 S. 4th E., Ste. 5
Mountain Home, ID 83647

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 for the fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript, to be held as a bond until the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript has been determined, at which time it will be paid in full
(c)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 for the clerk's

record, to be held as a bond until the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
determined, at which time it will be paid in full.
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

.

.

to 1.A.R. 20.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2013.
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES
By
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CERTIFICATE OF SERYl~E
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of June, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Michael C. Creamer
Thomas E. Dvorak

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax

GIVENS PuRsLEY ll.P

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

P.O. Box. 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

Victor Villegas ~
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IN nm DISTRICT COURT OF nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S FEES AND COSTS

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Under IRCP 54(e)(7) and the Plaintiff's
Application for Costs and Fees came before the court for oral argument on August 5, 2013.
Thomas E. Dvorak appeared telephonically for the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented
by Victor Villegas in person.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACK.GROUND

This trial involved a dispute regarding whether a deed for the conveyance of land
executed by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown in favor of Defendant Greenheart
operated to convey not only the described land but also the water rights appurtenant to the land at
the time of the conveyance. The Court summarized and analyzed the facts and law applicable to
this case in a previous summary judgment decision and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Direction for Entry of Judgment.1 The Court adopts those facts and law in this
decision.
1

Order Denying Summary Judameot on Cmmt I and Qrantjng in Part Summary lmlpw'M fel g1f1Rtl:ant eft Celtnt
II, filed 1/31/2013; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, filed 5/10/2013.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PlAINTIFF'S FEES
AND COSTS
,S,... 9
1

This action was initiated by Plaintiffs on April 5, 2012. Plaintiffs asserted two causes of
action against Greenheart in the Complaint to Quiet Title: Count 1 requested a declaratory
judgment on contract interpretation and Count 2 requested a declaratory judgment under the
principles of promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver. Greenheart answered without
filing any counterclaims.
In its January 31, 2013 decision on cross motions for summary judgment, this Court
granted summary judgment in part and denied summary judgment in part. 2 In its May 10, 2013
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, this Court found in
favor of Plaintiffs on Count 1 for Contract Interpretation, and Count 2 for Quasi-Estoppel and
Waiver.3 The only theory on which the Court did not affirmatively find in favor of Plaintiffs was
Count 2 for promissory estoppel.
Plaintiffs now move this Court for an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in this
matter as a result of obtaining the declaratory judgment they sought in this action. 4 After the
motion was filed, Plaintiffs noticed the Court there was an error in the amount of attorney's fees
requested and withdrew a portion of the claimed fees. 5 Greenheart opposed the motion, arguing
only that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees. 6 Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion for
an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(7). 7
The Court considered Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Fees; Plaintiffs' Verified
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees; the Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of
Portion of Qaimed Attorneys Fees; the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for
Costs and Attorneys' Fees; the Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees Requested Per IRCP
54(e)(7); the Memorandum in Support of Rule 54(e X7) Motion for Entry of an Award of
Attorneys Fees; and the affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak (5/31/2013).

2

See generally Order Denying Summary Judgment on Count I and Granting in Part Summary Judgment for
Defendant on Count II, filed 1/31/2013.
3
See generally Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment.
4
See generally Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Fees, filed 5/31/2013; Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of
Costs and Attorneys' Fees (hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees"), filed 5/31/2013.
5
See generally Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of Portion ofaaimed Attorneys Fees, filed 6n/2013.
6
See generally Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees (hereinafter
''Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Costs and Fees"), filed 6/13/2013.
7
See generally Motion for Award ofAttgmcp' fees Requested Pn IQCR 54(e)(7), tiltd <i'l4Q01li U11R8NfttMtm
in Support of Rule 54(e)(7) Motion for Entry of an Award of Attorneys Fees, filed 6/24/2013.
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LEGAL STANDARD

First, regarding awarding costs as a matter of right, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(dXl)(A) sets forth that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or
parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." Second, the court has the discretion to add items
of cost or increase the amount of the costs allowed ''upon a showing that said costs were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." I.RC.P. 54(d)(lXD). Finally, regarding awarding reasonable
attorney fees, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(eX1) sets forth that "[i]n any civil action the
court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may including
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided
for by any statute or contract." These standards are reiterated and elaborated upon under the
applicable sections of the Court's analysis below.
ANALYSIS

I.

Whether Greenheart Waived her Right to Object to the Costs and Fees
Requested by Not Filing a Motion to Disallow.

Plaintiffs contend Greenheart waived her right to object to their requested costs and fees
because she opposed their motion for costs and fees with a memorandum in opposition of costs
and fees instead of filing a motion to disallow costs and fees. 8 Plaintiffs point to the language of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6) which states:
Any party may object ... by filing ... a motion to disallow part or all of such costs
within fourteen (14) days of service of the memorandum of cost. ... Failure to
timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of
all objections to the costs claimed.
Rule 54(e)(6) applies this same rule to any objection to the allowance of attorney fees. Finally,
Plaintiffs cite two cases which essentially reiterate the language of this rule under facts not on
point with this case. The Plaintiff cites two cases. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804, 241
P.3d 972, 977 (2010), concluded a party waived any objections to the costs claimed when they
did not file a timely objection an d Templeton v. Hogue, 125 Idaho 130, 130- 131, 867 P.2d
1004, 1004-1005 (Ct. App. 1994) concluding an objection was waived where they did not file a
written objection but appeared at the hearing.

8

Memorandum in Support of Rule 54(e)(7) Motion for Entry of an Award of Attorneys Fees, pp. 2-3.
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In this case, unlike in Bagley and Templeton, it is undisputed that Greenheart actually
filed a written memorandum with the Court within the required 14 days of service of the
memorandum of costs objecting to Plaintiffs' claimed fees. This Court will not elevate form over
substance by denying Greenheart' s timely written objections simply because she did not style her
writing as a "motion to disallow costs and fees." Elevating form over substance is disfavored by
Idaho courts. See e.g. In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178, 182 (2005). Rule l(a)
demands that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.,, Greenheart filed a
timely written memorandum is sufficient to preserve her objections to Plaintiffs' motion for costs
and fees.
Therefore, the Court considers Greenheart's objections below.

IL

Whether Plaintilh are the prevailing party In this litigation.

Plaintiffs contend they were the prevailing party in this matter.9 Greenheart does not
dispute Plaintiffs' contention. As explained above, after a bench trial, the Court found in favor of
Plaintiffs on each of their causes of action and theories, with the exception of promissory
estoppel. The Court directed judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs in connection with the
judgment, the Court declared Plaintiffs the prevailing party and stated they were entitled to costs.
To determine whether a party is a prevailing party, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(l)(D) provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,

the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
Further, ''the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127
(2010).
Here, as set forth above, Plaintiffs prevailed at the bench trial, obtaining the declaratory
judgment they sought in their action. Greenheart did not assert any counterclaims against
9 Plaintiffs'

Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 1-2.
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Plaintiffs and Greenheart successfully defended against only Plaintiffs' theory of promissory
estoppel. Therefore, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action.

IIL

Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right
under Idaho Rule of Civil procedure 54(d)(l)(C).

Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $973.05 in costs as a matter of right under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(C). 10 These costs are separated into four categories: (1)
court filing fees; (2) service of process; (3) preparation of materials admitted into evidence at the
trial; and (4) reporting and transcribing fees for Greenheart's depositions. 11 Greenheart does not
dispute Plaintiffs are entitled to these costs as a matter of right.
Regarding awarding costs as a matter of right Rule 54(d)(l)(A) sets forth "costs shall be
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the
court." Rule 54(d)(l)(C) lists the costs which a prevailing party is entitled to as a matter of right.
Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(l) provides for court filing fees; Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(2) provides for fees for
service of any pleading; Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(6) provides for "[r]easonable costs of the preparation
of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a
hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of each
party;" and Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(9) provides for reporting and transcribing depositions.
The Court concludes Plaintiffs' requested costs fall squarely under those allowed.
Although the request for trial materials was not specifically delineated, there were maps,
photographs and other exhibits admitted at trial.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for

costs and fees to the extent it requests $973.05 in costs as a matter of right.

IV.

Whether Plaintiffs will be awarded discretionary costs.

Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $1,383.53 in discretionary costs under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D). 12 These costs are separated into six categories: (1) $160.00
for serving expenses for attempts to locate and serve realtor Darryl Rhead, who could not be
found; (2) $385.25 for a copy of the transcript of the trial to provide an Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court; (3) $125.00 for a title insurance policy litigation
report associated with filing a lis pendens on the property; (4) $16.00 for lis pendens recording
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fees; (5) $489.13 for Westlaw research; and (6) $208.15 for photocopies. 13 Greenheart does not
dispute that Plaintiffs should be awarded these discretionary costs.
Discretionary costs are at the court's discretion, but are only allowed ''upon a showing
that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the
interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(dXl)(D). Further,
The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in
the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific
item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any
objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own
motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings
supporting such disallowance.

Id. In short, "[t]he trial court must make express findings as to why a party's discretionary costs
should or should not be allowed." Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,
314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). The Court must make "[e]xpress findings as to the general
character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and
in the interests of justice." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court described the "exceptional" requirement
as follows:
·This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be "exceptional"
under I.R.C.P. 54(dX1Xo) to include those costs incurred because the nature of
the case was itself exceptional.... Certain cases, such as personal injury,(sic)
cases generally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that these costs
are considered ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).

Id. Such discretionary costs may include '"long distance phone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel
expenses' and additional costs for expert witnesses." Id.
Plaintiffs state the claimed discretionary costs were necessarily and reasonably incurred
by Plaintiffs in prosecuting their claims against Greenheart.

14

Plaintiffs also state the costs were

exceptional to this litigation as set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak. 15 The Court
analyzes each expense in tum below.
First, the $160.00 for serving expenses for attempts to locate and serve realtor Darryl
Rhead were necessary even though this case proceeded through trial without Darryl Rhead.
Although not named as a party, Mr. Rhead was the dual agent for the contract and sale at issue in

this case. Therefore, this Court finds that costs to locate and serve Mr. Rhead were necessary
13
t4

Id.
Id.
Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PIAINTIFF'S FEES
AND COSTS
6

614

and exceptional because of the nature of this case. The fact that Mr. Rhead was not ultimately
located and did not appear as a witness or party in this case does not make his presence in this
case any less necessary or exceptional. Therefore, the Court GRANTS this $160.00 as a
discretionary cost.
Second, although the $385.25 for a copy of the transcript of the trial may have been
convenient to assist in the preparation of proposed findings, the court does not find it was
necessary or exceptional as cases frequently involve focus on testimony in providing matters to
the Court. Third, the $125.00 for the title policy litigation report, $16.00 for lis pendens
recording, and $208.15 for photocopies similarly may have been necessary but are ordinary costs
of civil litigation, especially litigation which involves disputes over land and its appurtenances.
Finally, the Court will consider the $489.13 for Westlaw research under the research attorney
fees section below as a factor under Rule 54(eX3).
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent it requests $160.00
for service of Mr. Rhead but DENIES the remaining $1,223.53 in discretionary costs.

V.

Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $58,413.50 in reasonable attorney's fees. 16
This sum is separated into five categories: (1) $19,062 incurred by Michael C. Creamer; (2)
$28,005.50 incurred by Thomas E. Dvorak; (3) $1,850.00 incurred by Alex McLaughlin; (4)
$1,015.00 incurred by Eric B. Nelson, a paralegal; and (5) $9,261.00 incurred by Lisa Nicholas,
a paralegal. 17 Regarding awarding reasonable attorney fees, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(eXl) sets forth that "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which
at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract."
Plaintiffs provide two separate bases for awarding attorney fees: (1) the commercial
transaction provision of Idaho Code § 12-120(3); and (2) Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. 18 Greenheart disputes awarding attorney fees under either
of these bases because: (1) the gravamen of this lawsuit was not a "commercial transaction" as
defined under Idaho Code § 12-120(3); and (2) Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real Estate

16

The Plaintiffs initially requested $59,193.50 in attorney's fees but subsequently filed a Verified Notice of Errata
and Withdrawal of Portion of Oaimed Attorneys Fees which reduced the request to $58,413.50.
17
Dvorak Aft '5/31/201J). Ex. A
18 Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 3-6.
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Purchase and Sale Agreement was merged with the Warranty Deed and the statute of limitations
has passed. 19 The Court addresses these contentions in tum below.

A. Plaindffs are endtled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Plaintiffs contend their action qualifies as a civil action to recover on a commercial
transaction under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because the gravamen of the lawsuit was the sale and
conveyance of real property and water rights to Greenheart as an investment.20 Under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3), the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fee set by the court
"[i]n any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law." The tenn "commercial transaction" includes "all transactions except transactions for
personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). The scope of the commercial transaction rule
has been an object of continuous consideration by the Idaho appellate courts. In what has become
the seminal case on awarding attorney fees pursuant to the commercial transaction statute, the
Idaho Supreme Court summarized:
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial
transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees
are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting
to recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees
from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of
right in virtually every lawsuit filed.
Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990).

More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged and clarified the following:
From time to time the Court has denied fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on the
commercial transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort or
because no contract was involved. The commercial transaction ground in I.C. §
12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves
tortious conduct, nor does it require there be a contract. Any previous holdings to
the contrary are overruled.
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, UC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007).

The commercial transaction must be "between the prevailing party and the party from whom that
party seeks fees." Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 778, 264
P.3d 400, 417 (2011) (quoting Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735
19 See
20

genemlQI Greenbeatt' s Memo in Opp to Costa aad iMI
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(2011)). "[I]n order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the transaction must enter
the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 756,
274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012).

It is undisputed that the gravamen of this lawsuit was a dispute between Plaintiffs and
Greenheart regarding the purchase and conveyance of sixty acres of land and the appurtenant
water rights mistakenly transferred in the Warranty Deed. Plaintiffs rely on the following facts
which support that this purchase and conveyance was a commercial transaction for purposes of
Idaho Code § 12-120(3):

21

Greenheart purchased the land because she wanted to invest in real

estate in the Mountain Home Area. It is undisputed that since purchasing the land in 2007,
Greenheart has never lived or resided on the land. Greenheart wanted vacant land with low taxes
and low maintenance. Greenheart stated, "At the time of my purchase, I was very aware that my
parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to build a residence." Greenheart wrote that
"At the time of purchase, I was told that the land is dry and [the] grass that grows is good for
cattle and there is no structure of any kind; therefore, the tax will be minimal." As the result of
the efforts of Greenheart and Mr. Brown, the land was eventually classified by the Elmore
County Board of Tax Equalization as dry grazing land. Greenheart drafted, and Mr. Brown
signed, a dry grazing lease wherein the land which Greenheart bought was essentially leased
back to Mr. Brown for the sole purpose of using it for dry grazing. Greenheart owned several
other properties including a house in Japan, two properties in Alaska, two properties in Nevada,
and another property in Emmett, Idaho. Further, Elmore County made an offer to Greenheart to
purchase the land, but she declined to sell it at that time at the offered price but would consider
selling in the future at a higher price.
Greenheart argues the evidence in the record demonstrates that this case did not involve a
commercial transaction. 22 Specifically, Greenheart notes this Court found that "At the time of the
sale, Idaho Code§§ 42-227 and 42-111 provided that no water right was necessary to operate a
well for domestic purposes ... as a matter of law, there was an is a legal means to obtain a
well."23 Greenheart contends to now find a "commercial transaction" was involved in this case

21

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, pp. 4-5, ft 15, 17, 22; p. 12, ft 19,
23-25.
22
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23
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would contradict this Court's prior finding. 24 Finally, Greenheart contends the purpose of the
aforementioned dry grazing lease was solely to receive a reduction in taxes and not to receive
any income, and Greenheart did not receive nor intend to receive any profit from the lease.25
Regarding this Court's comments on Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111, Greenheart's
contentions are unavailing for two reasons. First, the simple statement that a well could be drilled
and operated on the land for domestic purposes does not at all indicate the sale and conveyance
of the land itself was for household or personal purposes. Second, a plain reading of the
definition of "domestic purpose" or "domestic use" under Idaho Code § 42-111 includes many
uses which are not necessarily residential or personal, including the use of land for farming,
grazing, or any other use that does not exceed a specified diversion rate or volume. So the Court
does not view "domestic" under the water statutes interchangeable with "household or personal"
under the attorney's fees statute.
Regarding the dry grazing lease, whether Greenheart received any income from the lease
is not dispositive. What is important is what this Court can infer regarding Greenheart' s purpose
for purchasing the land by in part considering what she did with the land after the purchase. The
facts cited by the Plaintiffs indicates she was not using the land for residential or personal
reasons and thus did not purchase the land for household or personal reasons. She bought the
property as an investment, not for household or personal reasons. However, Ms. Greenheart's
purpose alone is not dispositive. "[l)n order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the
transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc.,
152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012).
There was no testimony at trial directly addressing the Plaintiff's purpose for listing the
sixty acres for sale. The facts at trial were that the Browns had leased portions of their land's
appurtenant water rights to the Idaho Water Resource Board since 2003 and derived rent from
that lease. In 2006, Mr. Brown had contracted to sell 272 acres of the water rights to the Idaho
Water Company and that contract was terminated after the sale of the sixty acres to Greenheart.
Although the Browns had their residence on the 320 acre tract, they farmed and ranched on a
portion of the land. Mr. Brown only listed sixty of their three-hundred twenty acres in this sale
to Greenheart. The Browns subsequently sold or had a contract to sell any remaining water

24
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rights to the City of Mountain Home in 2012. The Browns had their residence on part of the
three hundred twenty acres but not on the sixty acres sold to Greenheart. Several years after the
sale to Greenheart, the Browns sold the rest of the land with the residence and moved their
residence to another location. However, that residence was not marketed simultaneously with
the property marketed and sold to the Defendant. In fact, the sale of the residence occurred a
significant period of time after the 2007 sale of the land at issue in this dispute. While the
Plaintiff focuses on the dry grazing lease, the testimony at trial related to the dry grazing lease
was that Mr. Brown entered into the lease to be "neighborly" and assist Ms. Greenheart in
obtaining an agricultural exemption but that transaction that occurred after the sale and was not
contemplated in the sale. Although the purpose of the dry grazing lease with Greenheart was not
a commercial purpose, this is not dispositive. In examining the overall purpose of the Plaintiffs
in the facts at trial, they used the tract of land at issue in this case, its water rights, and the sale of
the land for a commercial purpose ... to ranching, farming, and to derive income. The purpose of
the sale of the sixty acre tract of land, when viewed in light of their other actions of leasing,
contracting to sell, and selling other water rights, and later selling other portions of the land, was
a commercial transaction.
This case might turn differently if the land at issue was the land that contained the Brown
residence. But it was not. The facts at trial were that this sixty acres at issue in this case were
treated separately from the land with the residence. Therefore, it is this Court's determination
that the Plaintiffs entered into the transaction for a commercial purpose. In so finding, the Court
notes this decision is consistent with a line of authority going back nearly two decades in Idaho
courts regarding similar transactions. 26

26
See Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 P.2d 201, 214 (CL App. 1995) (concluding the lease of real
property constituted a commercial transaction where the land was purchased "for the purpose of operating a
commercial cattle ranch" and where the purchaser "did not maintain a home on the ranch property"); and Watson v.
Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 216, 219, 159 P.3d 851, 853, 856 (2007) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a
commercial transaction where the land was purchased as a family retreat and "in large part for purposes of logging it
and the district court was called upon to apportion the logging proceeds"); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 439,
80 P.3d 1031, 1040 (2003) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a commercial transaction where the land
was purchased "for the purpose of Gamer establishing an elk ranch," but not mentioning any residence or home on
the property even though the property description was a significant issue in the lawsuit); and Farm Credit Bank of
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a
commercial transaction where "Stevenson and the Bank entered into a transaction to finance the purchase of real
gmpcatY. wbjcb Stevenson intend"" to use gnd did, ns• fgg bit £QlRIRUGi1I RIARU.9 8)J8Nti8ft9,u agaht iWl
mentioning the presence of any residence or home).
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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the sale of land between Plaintiffs and the
Defendant was for commercial purposes under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). The Court also finds
that this commercial transaction was the gravamen of this lawsuit. The Court concludes Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) provides a basis for awarding Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees in this
action. The Court will not consider further bases for such an award of attorney's fees, including
under Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement.

B. Whether Plaintiffs' claimed attorney's fees are reasonable under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3).
Plaintiffs contend that $58,413.50 is a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(eX3). 27 Under Rule 54(eX3), the Court must consider: (1) the time and labor
required for this district court litigation all the way through trial and post-trial matters, (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill required for this type of litigation and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law, (4) the prevailing charges for
like work, (5) whether the fee was fixed or contingent, (6) the time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances of the case, (7) the amount involved and the results obtained, (8) the
undesirability of the case, (9) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client, (10) awards in similar cases, (11) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, and
(12) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. Plaintiffs have
submitted the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in part to help this Court make this necessary
determination under Rule 54(eX3). 28 The Court considered the affidavit in making the
determinations for each factor below.
This action was initiated by Plaintiffs on April 5, 2012. After discovery, the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. After the Court issued its decision on those motions, the
matter was heard as a court trial on March 5 and 6, 2013. After trial, Plaintiffs filed this motion
for fees and costs. Reviewing the record as a whole, this matter required slightly less time and
labor than this Court sees in the typical civil cases that proceed through trial. The questions the
parties addressed involved some frequently litigated issues, such as the merger of purchase and
sale contracts into a subsequent deed, but also involved less frequently litigated issues in
specialized areas of water law and real estate law, including the appurtenance of the water rights

TT
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and the legal effect of a mutual mistake. Given this mix of simple issues with more complex
issues, the skill required for this litigation is more specialized than this Court regularly sees in
more general civil litigation cases, and the experience and ability of the attorneys in this case met
that standard.
Reviewing the billing rates and invoices set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak,
Mr. Dvorak billed hourly at a rate of $260.00 per hour in 2012 and $275 per hour in 2013. Mr.
Creamer billed hourly at the rate of $270.00 in 2012 and $300.00 in 2013. The Court notes these
amounts are higher than usually charged in the civil litigation cases by attorneys in this area. By
"this area," the court is referring to Boise, Idaho. Although this litigation occurred in Elmore
County, this Court is familiar with the attorneys and expertise in this area and finds that the
prevailing rate for this geographic area includes the rates in Boise, Idaho, since many of those
that litigate civil cases in this area actually travel from Boise. Even considering the specialized
expertise and the higher prevailing rate for attorneys in the Boise area and who travel to outlying
areas, the rates requested are higher than partners with similar experience in similarly-sized
Boise law firms. The Court finds the average hourly rate in this geographic area, even for
attorneys with acquired expertise and years of experience, is $250.00 per hour. Most firms did
not increase billing rates in 2013 due to a still sluggish {although finally increasing) demand for
legal services and glut of still unemployed lawyers in this geographic region. Therefore, this
court finds the prevailing charges for similar specialized work that involves attorneys with an
acquired expertise in the relevant areas of law is $250.00 per hour and finds

this is a reasonable

fee for the services of Mr. Creamer and Mr. Dvorak. The hourly rate for Mr. McLaughlin as
billed is reasonable. The Court will reduce the fees requested accordingly.
Therefore, the Court has recalculated Mr. Creamer's fees based on the 62.7 hours worked
{the court did not include 6.9 hours for which the billing records indicate the client was not
charged and did include the hourly reduction from the errata filed). The Court calculates a
reasonable hourly fee for Mr. Creamer's services as $15,675.00. The Court has also recalculated
Mr. Dvorak's fees based on the 104.8 hours worked. The Court calculates a reasonable hourly
fee for Mr. Dvorak's services as $26,200.00.
The hourly rate of Mr. Nelson of $175.00 for a paralegal is also higher than usually
charged in that the prevailing charges for paralegal work in this geographic area. The prevailing
char.ges for paralegal work are half tbe boud¥ i:ate Qf a&t&m•ysa
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experience and expertise.in an area that is ''paperwork" and research intensive such as real estate,
the rate of $150.00 per hour is reasonable. Therefore, this court will reduce the requested fees
for Mr. Nelson to that amount and award $870.00 for his services. The rate charged for Ms.
Nicholas is a reasonable fee based on the above analysis. Although the court notes that these
fees included Ms. Nicholas attending trial for two full days, the Court finds the attendance by the
paralegal giving the number of documents, exhibits, and issues with technology in evidence
presentation was reasonable. Mr. Dvorak was the only attorney at the trial and did not bring a
string of associates to the trial of this case and the attendance and expertise of the paralegal at
trial was reasonable.
The billing rates, invoices, and testimony of Mr. Dvorak indicates Plaintiffs were billed
on a fixed hourly rate basis throughout the case. From beginning to end, this case followed the
same unremarkable time limitations of any other civil case - mainly the limitations placed on the
parties by the applicable scheduling deadlines. No further time limitations were imposed by the
parties. As Plaintiffs were seeking a declaratory judgment declaring their ownership of the at
issue water rights, the "amount" involved or "amount" awarded is not pertinent. Instead, what is
important to note is that Plaintiffs received the declaratory judgment they were seeking. As noted
in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, there was nothing undesirable about this case except for
perhaps. the relative value of the water rights sought compared to the costs of taking the case
through motions for summary judgment, trial, and perhaps an appeal.
Regarding the nature and length of the relationship with the client, Mr. Dvorak testifies
that his firm, Givens Pursley LLP, has provided legal advice and counsel to Plaintiffs for a
number of years on various matters. Regarding the reasonable cost of automated legal research,
the requested amount of $489.13 is reasonable for the research required on the legal issues in this
case, both at summary judgment and at trial, which involved specialized areas of law.
Based on this Court's determination of the pertinent factors, above, and the Court's
review of the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, including each individual entry of the billing
sheets submitted with that affidavit, the Court finds reasonable attorney's fees of $15,675.00 for
Mr. Creamer, $26,200.00 for Mr. Dvorak, $1,850.00 for Mr. McLaughlin, $870.00 for Mr.
Nelson, and $9,261.00 for Ms. Nicholas, and awards $489.13 as a reasonable cost for automated
legal research. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent it
requests $53,856 00 in reasanahJe attome>(s foes and $489 13 fnr mttomated legal research
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CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent of $973.05 in costs
as a matter of right; $160.00 in discretionary costs; $53,856.00 in reasonable attorney's fees; and

$489.13 for automated legal research. The Court makes a total award of fees and costs to the
Plaintiffs of $55,478.18.
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS 61h day of August, 2013.

L~

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
FINAL JUDGMENT

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, based upon the Judgment
filed May 23, 2013 and the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part Plaintiff's Fees
and Costs filed on August 6, 2013, that final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and
against Defendant on all counts and claims for relief of the Complaint; and fees and costs of
$55,478.18 are awarded to the Plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED and DATED this 6th day of August, 2013.

Lynn~
District Judge
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)
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)
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AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO
)
)
GREENHEART,
)
)
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I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify :
That the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record:
None.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
\..ft}\
said Court this
day of September, 2013.
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BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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Supreme Court
Case No. 41189-2013
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause
was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete record of the
pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28.
I further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled cause, see Clerk's
Certificate of Exhibits, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to the Record on Appeal:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing January 7, 2013
Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference- February 22, 2013
Transcript of Trial Testimony March 5, 2013
Transcript of Trial Testimony-March 6, 2013

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON- )
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Plaintifl/Respondent,
)
)
)
vs.
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Supreme Court
Case No. 41189-2013
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District" of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to
each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows:

Victor Villegas
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICE
141 E. Carlton A venue
Meridian, ID 83642

Thomas D'Vorak
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

